Insurgency BAAD: Dynamics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Campaigns

While there has been excellent country-specific quantitative analyses recently on the impact of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (see Chenoweth and Dugan 2012; Lyall and Wilson 2009), much of the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency has tended to provide case evidence and comparisons (e.g. Alexander 2002, Bhoumik 2004, De Graaf 2011). Even fewer studies provide cross-national quantitative evidence on efficacy (Ackerman and LaFree 2009).
This brief provides an initial analysis of the factors that make governments more likely to use “carrots” (rewards for refraining from violence), “sticks” (use of police and military force), or “mixed” approaches (that is, both inducements and coercion within the same year) to counter insurgent organizations (some of which use terrorism as a strategy and some of which do not). The brief also analyzes the relationship between such policies and the lethality of the organization.