A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Narrative

 

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Last Update

April 2015

Aliases

None

History

Hashim Salamat founded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1978, when the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) made its first attempt at peace talks and potential ceasefire agreements with the Philippine government.[1] The peace accord between the government and MNLF, which was signed in 1989, created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).[2] However, MILF believed that the ARMM local government was not autonomous enough, as it continued to defer all issues and matters to the national Philippine government.[3]

From the 1980s to 1990s, MILF gained power militarily and socially, due to the secluded mountainous geography in the southern region of the Philippines.[4] In its areas of control, MILF created Islamic communities that reported to MILF’s own Islamic governing and judicial system, thus in effect establishing a de facto Islamic community under the weak rule of MNLF’s ARMM.[5] MILF became the strongest representative for the Moros who were disappointed with the weak conditions of ARMM.[6]

In 2001, following years of violent conflict between MILF and the Filipino armed forces, the newly elected President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, fearing a MILF jihad against the Philippines, reversed former President Estrada’s war policy on MILF.[7] A ceasefire agreement was signed in 2003 to develop peace talks between MILF and the Philippine government.[8] However, this ceasefire was dismissed when the Memorandum of Agreement establishing the autonomous Muslim state, Bangsamoro, was deemed unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court on October 14, 2008.[9] Fighting erupted following the court’s decision, [10] resulting in the displacement of an estimated 600,000 people and dozens killed, as "rogue" MILF cells attacked Christian villages.[11] In July 2009, MILF and the Philippine government once again declared a ceasefire to allow new negotiations for a reshaped Memorandum of Understanding.[12] On October 7, 2012, the Philippine government signed off on the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) which would establish further rounds of dialogue between MILF officials and the government in establishing a Muslim autonomous polity in the Philippines.[13] After nearly 17 years of peace negotiations, the Philippine government signed off on the fourth and last annex to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on January 25, 2014.[14]

Home Base

Philippines (Sulu archipelago, the easternmost part of Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan)[15]

Founding Year

1978[16]

Ideology

Nationalist/Separatist-Moro.[17] Religious-Islamist.[18]

Specific Goals

  • Main goal is to establish an independent Islamic state, in the Muslim-dominated Mindanao region of the Philippines. [19]
  • During peace talks with the Philippine government, MILF proposed the establishment of a “Bangsamoro” autonomous state, a goal that would not result in full independence.[20]

Political Activity

  • During the 1980s and 1990s, MILF implemented Islamic governing and judicial systems in areas under its control.[21]
  • MILF has negotiation with the Philippine government, including:
    • A ceasefire agreement was signed in 2003 to develop peace talks between MILF and the Philippine government.[22]
    • In July 2009, MILF and the Philippine government declared a ceasefire to allow new negotiations.[23]
    • On October 7, 2012, the Philippine government signed off on the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), establishing further rounds of dialogue between MILF officials and the government.[24]
    • In January 2014, the Philippine government signed off on the fourth and last annex to the FAB.[25]

Financing

  • Funded by another violent group:
    • MILF received monetary support from Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida-linked networks.[26]
    • Al-Qa’ida member Jamal Khalifa has also been a key funder for MILF.[27]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • MILF is structurally set up with a main leader, then senior leaders, and local commanders.[28] Senior leaders are religious clerics while local commanders tend to be younger, highly radical, and militarily minded.[29]
  • 1977-August 2003: Hashim Salamat, founder, led the group until his death from unreported causes.[30]
  • August 2003-Present: Ebrahim Murad.[31]

Strength

  • 1990: 6,000.[32]
  • 2006: 10,000-11,000.[33]
  • 2009: 10,000-12,000.[34]
  • 2011: 11,000.[35]
  • 2012: 12,000.[36]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Al-Qa’ida (ally)
    • In 1994, al-Qa’ida militant, Ramzi Yousef, taught MILF and ASG forces how to use explosives.[37]
    • Since 1998, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a follower of bin Laden, recruited Filipino fighters to train in Afghanistan and channeled funds to MILF.[38]
    • MILF offered refuge to al-Qa’ida forces.[39]
  • Jemaah Islamiya (JI) (ally)
    • Captured leaders of JI have admitted to strong ties with MILF through the training of JI militants in MILF headquarters.[40]
    • As of 2009, the estimated number of JI cadres working with MILF was 30 to 40.[41]
  • Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (ally)
    • MILF’s relationship with ASG strengthened through increased collaborative efforts in bombings and other violent attacks since 2000.[42]
    • There is some evidence that MILF has provided assistance to ASG in their kidnapping and bombing efforts. [43]
  • New People’s Army (NPA) (ally)
    • The NPA and MILF created a tactical alliance in 1999 which continued until the peace treaty.[44]
  • Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (ally)
    • GAM militants were trained in MILF camps in 2003.[45]
  • MILF ended ties with other insurgent organizations as part of stipulations set forth in the signed peace treaty of 2014.[46]
  • Muslim Ulamas (ally)
    • Alliances were established with Muslim scholars, or Ulama, in order to gain support from the Muslim peoples in their areas of control.[47]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Philippines (enemy)
    • As an armed insurgency, the MILF and the AFP have frequently clashed.[48] These conflicts had killed an estimated 150,000 people through 2013.[49]
    • In response to MILF attacks, Philippine president Joseph Estrada declared an "all-out war" on the organization in 2000. MILF responded by declaring a "jihad" against the Philippine government.[50]
    • Since 1997, the MILF has been willing to engage in peace talks, despite periodic outbreaks of violence (sometimes instigated by splinter groups, or the AFP).[51] Fragmentation with MILF has resulted in sporadic violence (by so-called "rogue" commanders), but the group is seen as vested in the peace process.[52]
  • Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (rival)
    • MILF was formed as a splinter faction of the MNLF in 1978.[53]
    • The split reflected substantial ideological differences: ethnic nationalism vs. Islamic revivalism; ethnicity (Tausag vs. Maguindanao); and leadership styles (centralized vs. consultative).[54]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • Domestic Military:
    • President Joseph Estrada enacted a policy of war against MILF.[55]
    • Violent fighting occurred between MILF and the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) who launched counterterrorist air and land forces on the organization’s headquarters.[56]
  • Domestic Political:
    • For most of the 2000s, under President Arroyo’s new peacemaking approach, MILF and the Philippine government held on and off discussions on establishing an autonomous Muslim state.[57]
    • In 2003, MILF and the Philippine government agreed upon a monitored ceasefire that would be followed by peace talks for a potential memorandum of understanding.
    • In August 2008, the Philippine government and MILF signed a Memorandum of Agreement which entailed:
      • MILF ceasing all insurgent activities
      • Acknowledgment of the ancestral domain of Filipino Muslims and
      • Establishment of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) that shared authority and responsibility with the Philippine government.[58]
    • A new ceasefire established in July 2009, paving the way for the creation of a new memorandum of understanding. [59]
    • On October 7, 2012, the Philippine government signed off on FAB to further negotiations in creating the self-governing Bangsamoro to replace MNFL’s ARMM.[60]
    • These counterterrorist efforts that focused predominantly on negotiations and deals led to the formal signing of peace deals on January 24, 2014.
    • The four Annexes to the FAB establish the creation of the Muslim area called Bangsamoro and call for the end of all MILF insurgent activities and the disbanding of their near 12,000 troops.[61]
  • International Political:
    • From 1996 to 2006, the U.S. Agency for International Development gave $292 million in fiscal support to areas in the Philippines, like Mindanao, that are most susceptible to insurgent groups.[62]
    • On January 18, 2002, Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo requested the US to not list MILF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization due to ongoing peace negotiations throughout the 2000s.[63]
    • In 2008, U.S. State Department, classified the Southern Philippines as a possible terrorist safe haven due to the Philippine government’s weak control over this Islamic region.[64]
    • The Bush Administration greatly supported the Philippines in a three-pronged approach of utilizing military pressure, breaking MILF ties from JI and ASG, and establishing peace talks with MILF.[65]

United States Government Designations

None

Other Governments’ Designations

None

 

[1] Bertrand, Jacques. 2000. “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile.” Pacific Affairs 73 (1): 37–54. doi:10.2307/2672283.; “Factbox: The Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” Reuters, February 5, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-philippines-rebels-factbox-idUSTRE7140PP20110205

[2] Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E Curtis, Rex A Hudson, and Nina A Kollars. 2002. A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf.

[3] Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E Curtis, Rex A Hudson, and Nina A Kollars. 2002. A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf.

[4] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf; Bertrand, Jacques. 2000. “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile.” Pacific Affairs 73 (1): 37–54. doi:10.2307/2672283.

[5] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf; Toros, Harmonie. 2012. Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach. 1st Edition. New York: Routledge.

[6] Toros, Harmonie. 2012. Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach. 1st Edition. New York: Routledge.

[7] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf.

[8] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[9] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[10] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[11] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[12] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[13] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2014. “The Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Agree on Final Elements of Peace Agreement.” Press Statement. January 25. http://www.hdcentre.org/en/resources/news/detail/article/1390648821-the-government-of-the-philippines-and-the-moro-islamic-liberation-front-agree-on-final-el; Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2012. “Philippines Signs Framework Deal With Muslim Rebels.” Asia Unbound. October 9. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/10/09/philippines-signs-framework-deal-with-muslim-rebels/.

[14] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2014. “The Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Agree on Final Elements of Peace Agreement.” Press Statement. January 25. http://www.hdcentre.org/en/resources/news/detail/article/1390648821-the-government-of-the-philippines-and-the-moro-islamic-liberation-front-agree-on-final-el.

[15] Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E Curtis, Rex A Hudson, and Nina A Kollars. 2002. A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf.

[16] “Factbox: The Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” Reuters, February 5, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-philippines-rebels-factbox-idUSTRE7140PP20110205

[17] LOC. 2006. “Country Profile: Philippines.” Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Philippines.pdf.

[18] Santos, Jr, Soliman M, Paz Verdades M Santos, Octavio A Dinampo, Herman Joseph S Kraft, Artha Kira R Paredes, and Raymund Jose G Quilop. 2010. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Quezon, PHL: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-12-Philippines/SAS-Armed-Groups-Human-Security-Efforts-Philippines.pdf.

[19] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[20] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[21] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf; Toros, Harmonie. 2012. Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach. 1st Edition. New York: Routledge.

[22] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[23] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[24] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2014. “The Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Agree on Final Elements of Peace Agreement.” Press Statement. January 25. http://www.hdcentre.org/en/resources/news/detail/article/1390648821-the-government-of-the-philippines-and-the-moro-islamic-liberation-front-agree-on-final-el; Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2012. “Philippines Signs Framework Deal With Muslim Rebels.” Asia Unbound. October 9. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/10/09/philippines-signs-framework-deal-with-muslim-rebels/.

[25] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2014. “The Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Agree on Final Elements of Peace Agreement.” Press Statement. January 25. http://www.hdcentre.org/en/resources/news/detail/article/1390648821-the-government-of-the-philippines-and-the-moro-islamic-liberation-front-agree-on-final-el.

[26] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf.

[27] Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E Curtis, Rex A Hudson, and Nina A Kollars. 2002. A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf.

[28] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[29] BBC. 2009. “Guide to the Philippines Conflict.” BBC News, December 18, sec. Asia-Pacific. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7887521.stm; Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[30] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf.

[31] Mogato, Manny. 2011. “Factbox: The Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” Reuters, February 5. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-philippines-rebels-factbox-idUSTRE7140PP20110205.

[32] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf.

[33] LOC. 2006. “Country Profile: Philippines.” Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Philippines.pdf.

[34] Bhattacharji, Preeti. 2009. “Terrorism Havens: Philippines.” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. June 1. http://www.cfr.org/philippines/terrorism-havens-philippines/p9365; Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[35] Mogato, Manny. 2011. “Factbox: The Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” Reuters, February 5. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-philippines-rebels-factbox-idUSTRE7140PP20110205.

[36] Poling, Gregory B, and Liam Hanlon. 2012. “Manila and Moro Rebels Strike a Deal.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 12. https://csis.org/publication/manila-and-moro-rebels-strike-deal.

[37] Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E Curtis, Rex A Hudson, and Nina A Kollars. 2002. A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf.

[38] Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E Curtis, Rex A Hudson, and Nina A Kollars. 2002. A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf.

[39] Mogato, Manny. 2011. “Factbox: The Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” Reuters, February 5. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-philippines-rebels-factbox-idUSTRE7140PP20110205.

[40] Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Auden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. CRS Report for Congress RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

[41] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[42] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[43] Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E Curtis, Rex A Hudson, and Nina A Kollars. 2002. A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf.

[44] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report 202 February 14, 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/202-the-communist-insurgency-in-the-philippines-tactics-and-talks.aspx

[45] Kristen Schulze, "The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization," East-West Center, 2004. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/PS002.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=31983

[46] Poling, Gregory B, and Liam Hanlon. 2012. “Manila and Moro Rebels Strike a Deal.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 12. https://csis.org/publication/manila-and-moro-rebels-strike-deal.

[47] Bertrand, Jacques. 2000. “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile.” Pacific Affairs 73 (1): 37–54. doi:10.2307/2672283.

[48] De Castro, Renato Cruz. 2009. The Long Wars of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Southeast Asia Bulletin. International Security Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090212_sea_bulletin_feb.pdf.

[49] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[50] Huang, Reyko. 2002. “In the Spotlight: Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” CDI Terrorism Project. February 15. http://web.archive.org/web/20080709075858/http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/moro.cfm.

[51] Santos, Paz Verdades M. 2010. “The Communist Front: Protracted People’s War and Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines (Overview).” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, 17–42. Quezon, PHL: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-12-Philippines/SAS-Armed-Groups-Human-Security-Efforts-Philippines.pdf.

[52] Santos Jr., Soliman M, and Diana Rodriguez. 2010. “Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Its Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (MILF-BIAF).” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, 344–63. Quezon, PHL: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-12-Philippines/SAS-Armed-Groups-Human-Security-Efforts-Philippines.pdf; Dogan, Abdullah. 2015. “Turkish Monitor: Philippines Peace Deal to Continue.” Online News. Anadolu Agency. April 19. http://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/496407--turkish-monitor-philippines-peace-deal-to-continue.

[53] Bertrand, Jacques. 2000. “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile.” Pacific Affairs 73 (1): 37–54. doi:10.2307/2672283.; “Factbox: The Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” Reuters, February 5, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-philippines-rebels-factbox-idUSTRE7140PP20110205

[54] Santos Jr., Soliman M. 2010. “War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three Forms of Struggle, Three Tracks (Overview).” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, 58–90. Quezon, PHL: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-12-Philippines/SAS-Armed-Groups-Human-Security-Efforts-Philippines.pdf.

[55] Abinales, Patricio. 2004. American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East-West Center Working Papers 7. Politics and Security Series. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3639/PSwp007.pdf.

[56] Toros, Harmonie. 2012. Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach. 1st Edition. New York: Routledge.

[57] Poling, Gregory B, and Liam Hanlon. 2012. “Manila and Moro Rebels Strike a Deal.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 12. https://csis.org/publication/manila-and-moro-rebels-strike-deal.

[58] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[59] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

[60] Poling, Gregory B, and Liam Hanlon. 2012. “Manila and Moro Rebels Strike a Deal.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 12. https://csis.org/publication/manila-and-moro-rebels-strike-deal.

[61] “BBC. 2014. “Philippines Signs Landmark Deal to End Muslim Uprising.” Online News. BBC News. March 27. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26766215.

[62] Simon, Sheldon. 2008. “US Responds to Southeast Asian Political Turmoil.” Comparative Connections, October, 10. https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0803qus_seasia.pdf.

[63] Simon, Sheldon. 2002. “The War on Terrorism: Collaboration and Hesitation.” Comparative Connections, 4. https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0201qus_seasia.pdf.

[64] Bhattacharji, Preeti. 2009. “Terrorism Havens: Philippines.” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. June 1. http://www.cfr.org/philippines/terrorism-havens-philippines/p9365.

[65] Vaughn, Bruce, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E Manyin, Michael F Martin, and Larry A Niksch. 2009. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress RL34194. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.