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Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) Narrative

 

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

Last Update

May 2015

Aliases

Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda; Armeé de Libération du Rwanda (AliR); Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR); Interahamwe

History

The Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) formed in 2000 from two branches of the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (AliR), which was composed from the remnants of Rwanda’s defeated government that fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) after the 1990-1994 war between the Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR), the Interahamwe militia, and the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).[1] The group’s original objective was to overthrow the Rwandan government by force,[2] ousting the RPF,[3] and returning ethnic Hutu political leaders to power.[4] However, as the FDLR evolved and the RPF consolidated its control of Rwanda, its priorities shifted toward calling for an inter-Rwandan dialogue and a grant of security for refugees to return to Rwanda.[5] When the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) formed in 2006, representing Tutsi interests, it declared FDLR an enemy.[6] Beginning in late 2008, due to gross human rights violations and the security issue posed to DR Congo and Rwanda,[7] the governments of DR Congo and Rwanda cooperated militarily against both CNDP and FDLR, resulting in the collapse of CNDP and the weakening of FDLR.[8] In 2009 and 2010, FDLR’s leaders were arrested abroad, in Germany and France respectively,[9] collapsing the political wing. The FDLR, albeit significantly weakened, continues to remain a security issue for both DR Congo and Rwanda,[10] although it announced in November 2013 that it is potentially willing to disarm, along with other armed groups, following the surrender of M23,[11] a group formed by the mutiny of former CNDP members.[12] In 2015, the FDLR was accused of training the youth wing of Burundi's National Council for the Defense of Democracy, raising fears of another genocide, and leading over 100,000 Burundians to flee to neighboring countries.[13]

Home Base

Democratic Republic of Congo

Founding Year

2000

Ideology

Ethnic-Supremacist-Hutu[14]

Specific Goals

  • The FDLR seeks the removal of Rwanda's current government led by the Rwanda Patriotic Front,[15] and return ethnic Hutu political leaders to power.[16]
  • Currently, the FDLR calls for inter-Rwandan dialogue and security guarantees to members so they may return to Rwanda

Political Activity

  • The FDLR’s political branch operated in Europe under Ignace Murwanashyaka.[17]
  • In March 2005, the FDLR denounced the genocide and entered into negotiations to transform itself into a primarily political organization, along with the repatriation of all Rwandan refugees.[18] However, by August it was clear that the talks had failed.
  • International efforts to engage the FDLR in peace talks in 2008 were also unsuccessful, owing to growing conflict in the North Kivu region.[19]

Financing

  • Smuggling/Trafficking: 
    • Materials, such as cassiterite, coltan, gold, diamonds, and palm nuts, are periodically smuggled across the border, evading tax authorities.[20]
    • FDLR has a large stake in the illegal mining business, as well as the illegal drug trade in hemp, as a main source of profit.[21]
  • Charities/Donations: The group was also financed through donations from faith-based charities in Spain.[22]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • FDLR divided control into two branches, a political branch operating in Europe under Ignace Murwanashyaka and a military wing operating in the Eastern DR Congo under Sylvestre Mudacumura.[23]
  • FDLR, partially made up of former Rwandan army soldiers, is structured as a military organization.[24]
    • The military wing is divided into three brigades: the North Kivu Brigade, South Kivu Brigade, and the Reserve Brigade, led by Force Commander Sylvestre Mudacumura.[25]
    • Though FDLR’s leadership was arrested, the military wing continues to remain active within the region.
  • Political Leadership:
    • 2000-2009: Ignace Murwanashyaka, arrested in Germany in 2009 for his alleged involvement in the 1994 genocide.[26]
    • 2000-2009: Straton Musoni, assistant to Murwanashyaka, arrested in Germany in 2009 for his alleged involvement in the 1994 genocide.[27]
    • 2009: Secretary-General Callixte Mbarushimana, arrested in France.[28]
    • Former FDLR leaders Jean Marie Vianney Higiro and Felicien Kanyamibwa seceded in 2004 to form the United Rally for Democracy (RUD).[29]
  • Military Leadership:
    • 2000-present: Force Commander Sylvestre Mudacumura.[30]

Strength

  • 2003: 15,000-20,000[31]
  • 2005: 10,000-15,000[32]
  • 2008: 6,500-7,000[33]
  • 2011: 6,000-8,000[34]
  • 2013: 1,500-5,000[35]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Congolese army, FARDC (ally)[AEP1] 
    • The relationship between the FARDC and the FDLR oscillates between open conflict and covert cooperation.[36] From 2005-2007, the FARDC waged a military offensive against the FDLR. However, the FARDC and the FDLR are believed to have coordinated attacks on the CNDP and M23.[37]
    • The FARDC is known to have transferred weapons to FDLR units.[38]
    • FDLR fighters and FARDC soldiers jointly control the marijuana trade in the border areas of Lubero, Walikale and Rutshuru.[39]
    • Both FDLR and FARDC will deny this cooperation in public.[40]
  • PARECO (ally)
    • Secretly coordinate with FDLR against CNDP[41]
    • Though never fighting directly alongside each other, PARECO (up until its integration into FARDC in 2009) would launch coordinated attacks against CNDP from nearby positions.[42]
  • DR Congo Government (suspected ally)
    • The DR Congo government is alleged to have supported the FDLR since 1998[43]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Government of Rwanda/ Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)(Target)
    • At the outset, FDLR focused its attacks mainly on Rwandan officials and civilians,[44] as well as Congolese Tutsi communities.[45]
    • After the group was unsuccessful in its efforts to counter the Rwandan military, it ceased attacks on Rwandan soil in 2005.[46]
  • Congolese Tutsis (Target)
    • At the outset, FDLR focused its attacks mainly on Rwandan officials and civilians,[47] as well as Congolese Tutsi communities.[48]
  • CNDP (Rival, Violence between Groups, Target)
    • When the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) formed in 2006, representing Tutsi interests, it declared FDLR an enemy,[49] marking the beginning of conflict between CNDP and FDLR.
    • FLDR orchestrate attacks against CNDP, often coordinating with PARECO and FARDC.[50]
    • The Rwandan government and Rwandan army supported the Tutsi CNDP.
  • Smugglers (Rival, Violence between Groups)
    • The lack of a centralized and powerful government to control these resources and territory has led to conflicts between armed groups seeking to profit off illegal trade.[51]
  • DR Congo Government (Rival)
    • Beginning in late 2008, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda cooperated militarily against the FDLR.[52]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • International Military
    • The UN Stabilization Operation in DR Congo (MONUSCO) was initially established to monitoring compliance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.[53] Since then, its mission has expanded to peacekeeping in eastern Congo, especially Kivu province, where MONUSCO has cooperated with the FARDC to counter FDLR forces in 2015.[54]
    • Beginning in late 2008, due to the gross human rights violations of FDLR and the security issue it posed for both DR Congo and Rwanda,[55] the governments of the DRC and Rwanda cooperated militarily against both CNDP and FDLR, resulting in the collapse of CNDP and the weakening of FDLR.[56]
  • International Political
    • US policy towards DR Congo seeks to assist the transition to democracy,[57] essentially building the government’s capacity to handle threats posed by FLDR and other armed groups.
    • The US has reduced the financial gains through illegal mining by requiring US companies to take active measures to avoid the use of “conflict materials” in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.[58]
    • The US has contributed directly to MONUSCO, [59] and has helped to enforce UN sanctions on the FDLR.[60]
  • Domestic Military
    • Domestically, FARDC and the DR Congo government have also partnered with the Rwandan government and MONUSCO forces to launch military offenses against FDLR.[61] Also in 2009, a series of military operations, including Umoja Wetu, Kima II, Amani Leo, and Dragon Fire,[62] further weakened the group.

United States Government Designations

Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL), December 29, 2004.[63]

Other Governments’ Designations

United Nations (December 2012): List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596 (2005).[64]

 

[1] ICG. 2005. “The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All.” 25. Africa Briefing. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B025-the-congo-solving-the-fdlr-problem-once-and-for-all.aspx.

[2] BBC. 2007. “Updated: Profile of Rwandan Rebel Group, FDLR.” Online News. BBC Monitoring Africa. December 22. via LexisNexis.

[3] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[4] Le Sage, Andre. 2007. African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives. Potomac Books, Inc.

[5] BBC. 2007. “Updated: Profile of Rwandan Rebel Group, FDLR.” Online News. BBC Monitoring Africa. December 22. via LexisNexis.

[7] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, 10. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[8] Dagne, Ted. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments.” CRS Report for Congress R40108. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf.

[9] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[10] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[11] Arieff, Alexis. 2014. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and US Policy.” CRS Report for Congress R43166. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43166.pdf.

[12] ICRP. 2015. “The Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed May 21. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc.

[13] Iaccino, Ludovica. 2015. “Burundi Genocide Fear: Over 100,000 Flee Violence as Coup Fails.” Online News. International Business Times. May 15. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-genocide-fear-over-100000-flee-violence-coup-fails-1501467.

[14] ICG. 2009. “Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR - International Crisis Group.” 151. Africa Report. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151-congo-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-disarm-the-fdlr.aspx; BBC. 2013. “Commentary Calls for Disarmament of Rwandan Rebels Based in DRCongo.” Online News. BBC Monitoring Africa. September 16. via LexisNexis.

[15] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[16] Le Sage, Andre. 2007. African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives. Potomac Books, Inc.

[17] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[18] ICG. 2005. “The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All.” 25. Africa Briefing. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B025-the-congo-solving-the-fdlr-problem-once-and-for-all.aspx.

[19] ICG. 2009. “Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR - International Crisis Group.” 151. Africa Report. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151-congo-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-disarm-the-fdlr.aspx.

[20] Autesserre, Severine. 2007. “DRCongo: Explaining Peace Building Failures, 2003-2006.” Review of African Political Economy 34 (113): 423–41. doi:10.1080/03056240701672510.

[21] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[22] Baldauf, Scott. 2009. “Rwanda Rebel Leaders: US, French, Spanish, and Congo Business Links.” Christian Science Monitor, December 2. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2009/1202/p06s10-woaf.html.

[23] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[24] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[25] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[26] Karuhanga, James. 2015. “Rwanda: FDLR Trial - Phone Intercepts Pin Murwanashyaka, Musoni.” The New Times, January 14. http://allafrica.com/stories/201501140655.html.

[27] Karuhanga, James. 2015. “Rwanda: FDLR Trial - Phone Intercepts Pin Murwanashyaka, Musoni.” The New Times, January 14. http://allafrica.com/stories/201501140655.html.

[28] ICG. 2010. “Congo: No Stability in Kivu despite Rapprochement with Rwanda.” 165. Africa Report. International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/165-congo-pas-de-stabilite-au-kivu-malgre-le-rapprochement-avec-le-rwanda.aspx.

[29] Baldauf, Scott. 2009. “Rwanda Rebel Leaders: US, French, Spanish, and Congo Business Links.” Christian Science Monitor, December 2. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2009/1202/p06s10-woaf.html; ICG. 2009. “Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR - International Crisis Group.” 151. Africa Report. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151-congo-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-disarm-the-fdlr.aspx.

[30] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[31] ICG. 2003. “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration.” 63. Africa Report. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/rwanda/063-rwandan-hutu-rebels-in-the-congo-a-new-approach-to-disarmament-and-reintegration.aspx.

[32] ICG. 2005. “The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All.” 25. Africa Briefing. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B025-the-congo-solving-the-fdlr-problem-once-and-for-all.aspx.

[33] ICG. 2009. “Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR - International Crisis Group.” 151. Africa Report. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151-congo-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-disarm-the-fdlr.aspx.

[34] Dagne, Ted. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments.” CRS Report for Congress R40108. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf.

[35] BBC. 2013. “Commentary Calls for Disarmament of Rwandan Rebels Based in DRCongo.” Online News. BBC Monitoring Africa. September 16. via LexisNexis.

[36] SSRC. 2014. “FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies.” Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7BCD664AA5-24B4-E311-93FD-005056AB3675%7D.pdf.

[37] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf; SSRC. 2014. “FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies.” Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7BCD664AA5-24B4-E311-93FD-005056AB3675%7D.pdf.

[38] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf; SSRC. 2014. “FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies.” Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7BCD664AA5-24B4-E311-93FD-005056AB3675%7D.pdf; Munyaneza, James. 2015. “DR Congo Still Arming FDLR, Says UN Report.” Online Newspaper. The New Times. January 8. http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-01-08/184752/.

[39] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[40] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[41] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[42] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[43] BBC. 2007. “Updated: Profile of Rwandan Rebel Group, FDLR.” Online News. BBC Monitoring Africa. December 22. via LexisNexis; Munyaneza, James. 2015. “DR Congo Still Arming FDLR, Says UN Report.” Online Newspaper. The New Times. January 8. http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-01-08/184752/.

[44] Le Sage, Andre. 2007. African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives. Potomac Books, Inc.

[45] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[46] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[47] Le Sage, Andre. 2007. African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives. Potomac Books, Inc.

[48] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[49] ICG. 2009. “Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR - International Crisis Group.” 151. Africa Report. Nairobi: International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151-congo-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-disarm-the-fdlr.aspx.

[50] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[51] ICRP. 2015. “The Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed May 21. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc.

[52] Dagne, Ted. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments.” CRS Report for Congress R40108. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf.

[53] “DR Congo: Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.” 1999. ReliefWeb. July 10. http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-lusaka-ceasefire-agreement.

[54] Agence France-Presse. 2015. “DR Congo Says Offensive against Hutu Rebels Underway.” News Portal. Yahoo News. January 31. http://news.yahoo.com/dr-congo-says-offensive-against-hutu-rebels-underway-161230672.html.

[55] Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. 2008. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC.” Fatal Transactions. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/20080506_Mapping_Eastern_DRC.pdf.

[56] Dagne, Ted. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments.” CRS Report for Congress R40108. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf.

[57] Dagne, Ted. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments.” CRS Report for Congress R40108. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf.

[58] Dagne, Ted. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments.” CRS Report for Congress R40108. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf.

[59] Arieff, Alexis. 2014. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and US Policy.” CRS Report for Congress R43166. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43166.pdf.

[60] Arieff, Alexis. 2014. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and US Policy.” CRS Report for Congress R43166. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43166.pdf.

[61] Arieff, Alexis. 2014. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and US Policy.” CRS Report for Congress R43166. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43166.pdf.

[62] TSA. 2012. “Factsheet on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.” Think Security Africa. http://thinksecurityafrica.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FDLR.pdf.

[63] US Department of State. 2004. “Terrorist Exclusion List.” Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm.

[64] UN Security Council. 2012. “Sanctions Committee Concerning Democratic Republic of Congo Adds Two Individuals, Two Entities to Sanctions List.” Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. December 31. http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10876.doc.htm.

 [AEP1]Based on narrative, FARDC later became an enemy.