More Bang for the Buck?: Examining the Effect of Technological Change on Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The findings of the study suggest that:

1) Terrorists are likely to quickly recognize the utility of new technologies.

2) Awareness of WMD-relevant technologies could arise from: a) trial and error; b) self-initiated search; c) demonstration by others; d) change agents.

3) The decision-making structure for adoption reflects the social and organizational structures of the adopting entity.

4) Cultural resistance and internal inertia can be very strong (terrorists must have "cultural compatibility" with innovation in general as well as the new weapon for successful adoption to occur).

5) It will be necessary for terrorists to acquire both the "hardware" and the "software" of new technologies before they can be used as true WMD.

6) The default application of new weapons, at least initially, has been to fit them into existing patterns of analogous weapons usage.

The panel of experts participating in the structured elicitation collectively estimated that:

1. The probability of non-state actors successfully perpetrating a WMD (catastrophic-level) attack within the next 25 years is substantial, and that this probability will increase as time passes.
2. The ranking of the most likely types of weapon jihadists might use is chemical weapons in first place, followed in second place by radiological in the near term and biological in the longer term, and nuclear weapons being the most difficult to successfully deploy.
3. In terms of the most likely candidates to successfully perpetrate a WMD attack within the next 10 years, the most highly-ranked actors were (in descending order of likelihood), a) Sunni jihadists, b) an apocalyptic cult, c) Shi'a jihadists and d) a disgruntled individual.
4. In terms of the timing of successful adoption of the new weapons technologies in the form of a true WMD, the experts believed that terrorists would more likely than not be able to adopt: a) the requisite raw materials and equipment for radiological and chemical weapons already, for biological weapons by the end of 2010 and for nuclear weapons by 2021; b) the scientific and technical expertise and personnel for radiological and chemical weapons already and for biological and nuclear weapons by 2014, and c) the funding and support infrastructure to develop radiological weapons already, chemical and biological weapons by 2011 and nuclear weapons by 2014.
5. Jihadists are more likely to manufacture their own weapons than to attempt to purchase or steal them.