Citation
Catignani, Sergio. 'Getting COIN' at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army
. Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 35, no. 4 (2012): 513-539. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2012.660625.
Findings
The study finds support for the argument that the British tactical-level units were unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric (hearts-and minds) operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of COIN warfare and the training needed to internalize such principles. Despite the Army's top-down organizational innovations and focus on lessons learned, institutionalization of bottom-up adaptation has not happened. The training still focused predominantly on conventional threats and basic soldiering and command/control procedures. When the focus turned to incorporating insights from the Afghan war into the training, the emphasis has been on providing the basic survival and tactical skills needed to deal with the threats present in Helmand, with greater attention to clear and hold strategies. There was not enough time and resources to train the units in the deeper understanding of COIN warfare and how to conduct population-centric operations, including influence operations. Several short courses on COIN principles did not provide enough depth to understand the complexity of COIN. Lack of highly qualified personnel to provide guidance on conducting influence operation also contributed to the problem.
Tags
Lever of Power: Information Lever of Power: Intelligence Lever of Power: Development Method: Qualitative Geoscope: Single country UN Region: Southern Asia DOD Region: CENTCOM Country: Afghanistan Actor: State Target: Consitituents Target: General Population Target: Sympathizers Type: Article Year: 2012
Research Background
- Research questions
- To what extent did the British Army adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan to focus on population-centric approaches? (inferred)
- Hypotheses
- Tactical-level units were unable to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of COIN warfare and limited opportunities to internalize such principles. (inferred)
Variables or Concepts
- Independent variables & concepts
- Military training
- COIN doctrine
- Dependent variables & concepts
- Military adaptation structure
Methodologies
- Qualitative method description
- Semi structured individual interviews and small focus groups (2-4 members per focus group) of British combat infantry personnel who served in Afghanistan
Time Frame
- Start: 2009
- End: 2011