Publication details | Global Responses to Asymmetric Threats

Summary
Analytical Information

Citation

MacDonald, Paul K. 'Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion': The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure. International Organization Vol 67, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 253-286. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818313000027.

Findings

The study finds that colonial insurgencies fought after 1918 are statistically significantly more likely to result in defeat for the incumbent government, thus supporting the hypothesis. The author argues that likely mechanism has to do with changed global political contexts between the 19th and 20th centuries. After the 19th century, colonial incumbents were at a disadvantage, as colonial domination lost legitimacy. Previously, colonial rule was legitimized in bilateral agreements between colonial powers and international legal standards intended to justify colonial rule. Even in competition with one another, European powers exercised constraint by not funding guerillas struggling against colonial rivals. In the 20th century, it became the norm to transfer sovereignty to former colonies. The establishment of the United Nations directly contradicted colonial rule, and insurgents wishing to struggle against colonial powers had access to support. Additionally, domestic political concerns shifted, with the public placing less emphasis on overseas treasures along with declining economic interest/benefit in colonies and the stress colonial rule placed on military forces. Additionally, colonial powers found it increasingly difficult to maintain collaborative relationships with indigenous inhabitants of their colonies. Finally, 20th century colonial powers did not have the flexibility to choose when to fight the insurgents. In the 19th century, colonial powers could be discriminative when it came to staking colonial claims, making them in territories where they had adequate support. By the 20th century, however, they had already formalized their stakes and had an interest in specific colonies: direct challenges to these colonies therefore demanded a response lest they walk away from a fight and severely injure their prestige.

The study also shows that when colonial powers are increasing the number of colonial possessions, they are more successful at defeating insurgencies in their colonies. This is likely because colonial expansion demonstrates an ambitious empire with the capability to suppress and defeat the enemy. However, in the full model, the coefficient is not statistically significant, though it remains positive. This offers some support of the hypothesis.

Furthermore, the study demonstrates that when global hegemons (i.e., the U.S. and Britain) have a large number of colonial assets, they are more likely to defeat colonial insurgencies. This is likely due to a favorable global political context. However, in the full model, the coefficient is not statistically significant though it remains positive. This offers some support for the hypothesis.

Another finding is that the precolonial level of development has a statistically significant and negative effect on the likelihood of success against a colonial insurgency, thus there's support for the hypothesis. This indicates that colonies that had low levels of development prior to colonization were likely to provide opportunities for the colonial power to forge collaborative relationships with certain segments of the indigenous population due to the population's likely fragmentation.

The study also finds that insurgencies occurring in new colonies or young colonies were more likely to result in a success for the colonial incumbent than those occurring in longstanding colonies, thus supporting the hypothesis. This suggests that the proposed mechanism is plausible: in territories in which colonial empires have a longstanding regime, they lose the flexibility to choose how to fight an insurgency.

Finally, in connection to the British operations in South Africa, the case study explored in the article shows that the forces in South Africa were able to successfully defeat Xhosa insurgents in the 19th century due to a political context favorable to colonial powers that enabled the British to deploy the necessary means to engage in COIN. Colonial officials in Africa received support from the British mainland due to the empire's interest in the continent, providing a steady stream of funds and supplies. Additionally, at the global level, colonialism was accepted as a norm, which prevented colonial rivals from directly intervening in the South African conflict on behalf of the Xhosa. The British were also successful at forging collaborative ties with segments of the indigenous population to establish a dense network of allies. This enabled the British to recruit indigenous soldiers and police and leverage their knowledge of local terrain and culture to the benefit of the British. Finally, the British were able to strategically choose their fights, which freed up resources to use in the COIN effort. By accommodating different clans and cutting deals with different tribes, the British could avoid additional rebellions that would distract them from the core Xhosa threat.

Research Background

Research questions
1. What can explain the historical decline in government incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars?
2. How does British success against Xhosa insurgents in the 19th century South Africa illustrate the thesis that the 19th century political context was more favorable to incumbents defending themselves against insurgencies?
Hypotheses
1. Colonial insurgencies fought after 1918 are more likely to result in defeat for the incumbent government.
2. Colonial incumbents who are continuing to increase their colonial possessions will fare better against insurgencies than those that are not.
3. The more colonial dependencies a hegemon (e.g., the U.S., Britain) possessed before 1918, the more successful states will be at defeating insurgencies, as the political and institutional order is likely to be conducive to colonial rule.
4. In colonial societies with low levels of development, colonial powers will be more successful against insurgencies, as they are likely to find indigenous collaborators given the fragmented setting.
5. Colonial powers will be more successful at defeating insurgencies in new colonies than in colonies in which they have a long established regime.
6. Favorable political context that made colonialism the norm contributed to the incumbent's success.

Variables or Concepts

Independent variables & concepts
1. Colonial government, after 1918
2. Colonial government
3. Colonial trend in increasing colonies
4. Colonial hegemony
5. Precolonial level of development
6. New colonial conquest
7. Political context
Dependent variables & concepts
1. Counterinsurgency outcome

Methodologies

Quantitative method description
1. Regression analysis
Qualitative method description
1. Historical case study of British success against the Xhosa insurgency in the 19th century based on secondary sources

Time Frame

Start: 1800
End: 2005