Publication details | Global Responses to Asymmetric Threats

Summary
Analytical Information

Citation

Ozdogan, Ali; Ozdogan, Zeliha. A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis of PKK Terrorism and Turkey's Counterterrorism. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Vol 18, no. 2 (2023): 189-212. DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2022.2117568.

Findings

The author finds evidence for the main hypothesis that repressive and conciliatory CT against extremists increases their involvement in terrorist activity, while repression against moderates decreases their involvement in terrorist activity. The model contributes to the current knowledge base of counterterrorism by providing empirical evidence that repressive and conciliatory CT can increase or decrease terrorism, depending on the target population's degree of solidarity with a terrorist movement. The author provides three models. The analysis for each model has three steps: running the VAR, obtaining the impulse response plots, and obtaining the variance decomposition tables. The VAR-intervention estimates exhibit the ﬁtness of the model and provide information about eﬀect of the intervention, A (i.e. the exogenous variable that represents the implementation of Turkey's Repentance Law in 2003). Model 1 has three time-series variables: two endogenous variables (HPTER and FORCE) and an intervention variable (A) and tests the following corollaries: (1) Turkey's conciliatory CT policy for PKK extremists is positively associated with occurrence of violent terrorist attacks and (2) Turkey's repressive CT policy against PKK extremists and the number of PKK's violent terrorist attacks are positively associated. Model 2 has three time-series variables: two endogenous variables (MURDER and FORCE) and an exogenous variable (A) and tests the following corollaries: (3) Turkey's conciliatory CT policy for PKK extremists is positively associated with the number of people killed by PKK terrorists and (4) Turkey's repressive CT policy against PKK extremists and the number of people killed by PKK extremists are positively associated. Model 3 has three time-series variables: two endogenous variables (LPTER and DET) and an exogenous variable (A) and tests the following corollary: (5) Turkey's repressive CT policy and the number of PKK's nonviolent incidents are negatively associated. Corollaries 1 and 3 demonstrate that Turkey's conciliatory CT policy (i.e. the Turkey's Repentance Law in 2003) and PKK's violent activities are positively associated. There may be several explanations for this. First, PKK's top leadership who were not being provided a conciliatory oﬀer might have ordered the PKK militia violence to take vengeance against the state which tried to buy oﬀ supporters through the conciliatory oﬀer. Second, perceiving that the conciliatory policy is an attempt to undermine the terrorist organization, PKK might have signaled to the state that 'the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy [state] continues a particular [conciliatory] policy'. Third, the PKK might have perceived the state's conciliatory oﬀer as a concession. Subsequently, they increased their violence to obtain more concessions. Corollaries 2 and 4 demonstrate that Turkey's repressive CT policy against PKK's extremists, and PKK's violent activities are positively associated. Terrorists use violence to provoke the government, with disproportionate repression intended to turn the populace against it. States take the bait for various reasons such as electoral pressure over the elected decision makers, the state's low capacity or ignorance to redress grievances, and the state's limited capacity to design and employ more eﬀective CT options. The positive association between PKK's violent activities and Turkey's repressive CT is consistent with the body of the literature arguing that repression backﬁres and it increases extremists' activities by provoking retaliation, catalyzing countermobilization, generating grievances, strengthening group solidarity, and generating other negative externalities. Corollary 5 demonstrates that Turkey's repressive policy, which includes police detention during PKK's nonviolent activities, is negatively associated with PKK's nonviolent activities, which were dominantly carried out by the moderates. Repression's eﬀect of decreasing nonviolent activities can be explained by its 'direct eﬀect', which involves inducing fear in moderates. For moderates, fear increases the cost of terrorism to a level that deters their engagement. The ﬁrst four corollaries show that both Turkey's repressive and conciliatory CT policies targeting extremists were positively associated with the violent activities carried out mainly by PKK extremists. In other words, both repressive and conciliatory policies targeting PKK extremists backﬁre. This is because extremists' decision to use violent means is not a simple rational calculation based on individual incentives, but involves other dynamics such as existential threat to collective survival and political eﬃcacy. Extremists perceived both repressive and conciliatory CT as threats to their collective survival, which prompts violent responses. In addition, extremists have a relatively higher level of political eﬃcacy, which is believing that they can make changes in the political domain. Extremists, due to their relatively stronger sense of an existential threat to their collective identity and their higher levels of political eﬃcacy undervalue the short-term cost of terrorism in their rational calculations, and thus choose violent means with long-term prospects. In other words, as the prospect theory suggests, extremists place more weight on perceived gains than perceived loses. Accordingly, when politically eﬃcacious PKK members (i.e. extremists) face repression or conciliatory oﬀers, they choose to take risks by escalating violence due to a small hope of winning the battle against the state. The corollaries derived from the analyses demonstrate that repressive and conciliatory CT can increase or decrease terrorism, depending on the target population's degree of solidarity with a terrorist movement. Both repressive and conciliatory CT policies exacerbated PKK's violent activities mostly carried out by extremists who have relatively higher level of existential anxiety and senses of political eﬃcacy. On the other hand, repressive CT deterred PKK's non-violent activities mostly carried out by moderates. The ﬁndings support the prospect theory which suggests that certain groups in risky conditions (e.g. threat to collective survival) take more risky actions for a small hope of avoiding large losses.

Research Background

Research questions
1. What is the impact of Turkey's repressive and conciliatory counterterrorism (CT) policies on moderate and extremist members of the terrorist group, Partiye Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), in the period 1999-2007?
Hypotheses
1. Repressive and conciliatory counterterrorism measures against extremists increases their involvement in terrorist activity, while repression against moderates decreases their involvement in terrorist activity.

Variables or Concepts

Independent variables & concepts
1. Number of PKK fatalities in CT operations, FORCE
2. Number of PKK members detained during low-profile incidents, DET
3. Conciliatory CT policy
Dependent variables & concepts
1. Fatalities/murders by PKK members
2. High-profile terrorist incidents - HPTER
3. Low-profile terrorist incidents - LPTER

Methodologies

Quantitative method description
1. Vector-autoregression (VAR) time series intervention analysis of PKK terrorism and Turkey's counterterrorism policies

Time Frame

Start: 1999
End: 2007