



Government Responses to Asymmetric Threats: The State of the Literature on Counterterrorism from 2010 to 2023

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ABOUT THE PROJECT

This interim report is part of the “Global Responses to Asymmetric Threats: Phase 1 of Irregular Warfare Net Assessment Data Structure” project, part of the Asymmetric Threat Analysis Center (ATAC), a joint program between START and UMD’s Applied Research Lab for Intelligence and Security (ARLIS). ATAC is funded by the Department of Defense under award no. HQ003421F0481. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense.

ABOUT START

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is a university-based research, education and training center comprised of an international network of scholars committed to the scientific study of terrorism, responses to terrorism and related phenomena. Led by the University of Maryland, START is a Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence that is supported by multiple federal agencies and departments. START uses state-of-the-art theories, methods, and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics, and effects of terrorism; the effectiveness and impacts of counterterrorism and CVE; and other matters of global and national security. For more information, visit www.start.umd.edu or contact START at infostart@umd.edu.

ABOUT ARLIS

The Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence and Security (ARLIS), based at the University of Maryland College Park, was established in 2018 under the sponsorship of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)). As a University-Affiliated Research Center (UARC), ARLIS’ purpose is to be a long-term strategic asset for research and development in artificial intelligence, information engineering, and human systems. ARLIS builds robust analysis and trusted tools in the “human domain” through its dedicated multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary teams, grounded both in the technical state of the art and a direct understanding of the complex challenges faced by the defense security and intelligence enterprise. For more information, visit www.arlis.umd.edu/about-arlis or contact ARLIS at info@arlis.umd.edu.

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Introduction & Project Background

In 2022, the U.S. released a National Defense Strategy document, which highlights a shift away from counterterrorism to integrated deterrence against major powers, specifically Russia and China.¹ Despite this reorientation, the threat from terrorism is far from over. The 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel marked the largest offensive by this terrorist organization in the country's history;² it ignited another conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and empowered the Houthi militias in Yemen to attack U.S. ships. These series of connected conflicts and attacks demonstrate that the power of terrorist organizations to spur violence and regional instability remains potent. The scale of Hamas' attacks also show that governments continue to struggle with counterterrorism (CT) measures, especially with eliminating the threat from established and long-lived organizations. In this report, we present an overview of the existing state of research on state responses to domestic and global terrorist threats, focused on literature published from 2010 through 2023. This report is based on research conducted for the Global Responses to Asymmetric Threats project, which is part of a broader research effort, Irregular Warfare Net Assessment Data Structure (IW-NEADS).

The goal of IW-NEADS is to create a data resource that improves assessment, analysis and prioritization across three pillars of irregular warfare (IW)³: unconventional warfare (UW), counterterrorism (CT), and counterinsurgency (COIN). Specifically, the data resource provides insights on key findings from academic literature, hypotheses, independent and dependent variables, methodology and data, geographic and temporal coverage, and levers of state power that were explored in the articles. It facilitates gap analysis by enabling scholars to identify and fill prioritized research gaps and provides pedagogical resources for training and practitioner education.

This report provides a comprehensive review of academic studies on counterterrorism (CT), defined as “activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”⁴ It is part of a series of START's reports on government responses to asymmetric threats. Previous reports provided insights on government responses to insurgent threats, the use of military lever of power in COIN, the use of information lever of power in COIN, the use of legal responses in COIN, and the adversaries' reliance on information operations and governments' responses to such operations. Like our past reports, this CT report highlights the methodology that guided our extraction of the literature on government responses to terrorism. We present the coding scheme created to classify a diverse body of scholarly literature. Next, we delve into key summary findings: from dependent and independent variables that have been analyzed by scholars to the methodologies that they used. We then discuss the geographic coverage of existing research, the major targets of state strategies, and the deployment of different levers of state power in CT.

In the report's final section, we discuss existing research gaps and potential pathways for future research. This section provides specific insights on improvements related to concepts/methodology and substantive areas. It suggests, for example, a multi-faceted approach to CT, with focus on mobilizing soft and hard power, in a way that resembles more successful approaches to counterinsurgency.

¹ Rosenbach (2024).

² Mounier (2024).

³ Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over target populations (Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept 2007).

⁴ Theohary (2024:1).

Methodology

Our process for collecting data to analyze existing studies' focus on government responses to terrorism, included three steps: identifying relevant sources, developing a bibliography, and extracting data from the literature (see Figure 1 below).




Figure 1: Knowledge Matrix Development

Source Identification

To identify relevant sources, we considered literature published between 2010 and 2023 to focus on findings that are most relevant to the contemporary global context. We used “counterterrorism” and “CT” as search strings in academic search engines (e.g., Google Scholar) and online databases (e.g., JSTOR, Academic Search Ultimate). Due to a very large volume of published articles in journals, trade magazines, book chapters, and reports, we narrowed our search to empirical pieces only that engage in hypothesis testing either explicitly or implicitly. We also considered literature published in the English language. As the search strings identified a wide range of literature related to counterterrorism, for this phase of the project, we focused on those pieces specifically analyzing government responses to terrorism. This process yielded 192 unique pieces of literature for data extraction and analysis.

Bibliography Development

The research team transferred literature sources to a collaborative Zotero library, an open-source reference management software, to create a bibliography consisting of journal articles, book chapters, and reports. Each bibliographic entry in Zotero was assigned a unique system-generated key and contained a PDF copy of the publication. Each Zotero entry also contains metadata about every publication, such as the author, year of publication, type of publication, among other features. The creation of a bibliography in the Zotero library allowed us to move into the final step in the data collection process: data extraction from the literature.

Literature Extraction

To facilitate data collection, the project lead drafted a literature extraction guide, which the team then collectively improved on through an iterative process (see Appendix A: Literature Extraction Guide). Each coder received a document with instructions on how to properly extract relevant information from the literature and participated in two online training sessions. When coding discrepancies arose, these were resolved in cooperative meetings. All coding took place in a shared google spreadsheet

managed by, and exclusively accessible to, the research team. The spreadsheet was reviewed for completeness and accuracy by senior research personnel.

Each piece of literature was coded across several dimensions. We recorded the hypotheses, research questions, the dependent, independent, control variables (which can be qualitative or quantitative) used to test the hypotheses, and the method used in the analysis. For quantitative studies, we also recorded any datasets utilized in the study. The most detailed aspect of our data collection is the summary of the findings for each hypothesis. Additionally, we included indicators capturing the temporal and geographic scope of each piece. For publications with a temporal focus, we recorded the start and end years of the analysis. To explore the studies' geographic focuses, we noted the presence or absence of each UN geographic sub-region and the DoD's Combatant Command areas of responsibility (AORs). For studies that concentrated on five or fewer specific countries, we coded for the presence of specific countries using the country codes from the Correlates of War (COW) country list.⁵

Findings

Research Type

The body of counterterrorism literature reviewed here comprises academic journal articles, book chapters, and reports. Of the 192 unique sources analyzed, academic journal articles constituted the majority, accounting for 175 pieces (91%). The remainder included 11 book chapters (6%) and 6 reports (3%).

Frequency of Publications Over Time

As illustrated in Figure 2, the distribution of publications has exhibited a relatively consistent pattern, with prominent peaks in 2011, 2018, 2020, and 2021. Notably, approximately 35 percent of the available literature was published between 2020 and 2023, reflecting heightened research activity during this period. Conversely, 2013 and 2017 experienced the lowest levels of publication output.

⁵ Correlates of War (2022).




Figure 2: Distribution of Publications Over Time - (2010-2023)

Geographic Focus

Our analysis reveals that counterterrorism literature demonstrates a pronounced focus on Southern Asia, with approximately 20 percent of the studies analyzed concentrating on this region. Western Asia emerges as the second most studied region, accounting for 17 percent of the analyzed literature. Northern Europe features prominently as well, comprising 15 percent of the literature. Focus on Western Africa accounts for 14 percent of the research, while 13 percent of the studies concentrate on Eastern Africa. Northern America accounts for 13 percent of the analyzed literature. Other regions focus less prominently in the literature.

Overall, Pakistan is the most frequently studied country, followed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. Together, these five countries account for approximately 42 percent of the literature analyzed. Approximately 16 percent of the publications examine multiple countries across different regions, while 14 percent focus on multiple countries within the same region. Nearly half of the studies analyzed (49%) concentrate on a single country, and only 7 percent consider subnational levels of analysis. Furthermore, about 11 percent of the literature adopts a global perspective, and 3 percent lack a specific geographic focus.

Methodological Focus

Empirical research within this field demonstrates the use of qualitative, quantitative, and formal mathematical modeling methodologies. Qualitative methods were employed in approximately 73 percent of the reviewed studies; quantitative methods in about 29 percent; and formal mathematical modeling in 7 percent. Fifteen studies adopted mixed methods approaches, integrating multiple methodological frameworks.

Qualitative research in counterterrorism literature is predominantly case studies. Case studies constructed from secondary sources only make up the largest part of all qualitative research, with that method found in 45 percent of all counterterrorism literature. Secondary sources include previously

published books, articles, reports, and studies, as well as government publications, policy documents, organizational reports, media resources, and legal documents.

Case studies based on primary sources, such as interviews and field work, comprise about 23 percent of all counterterrorism literature, while primary archival research case studies make up about 5 percent. Interviews and field work primarily focused on gathering information from government officials,⁶ defense lawyers,⁷ military officers,⁸ activists,⁹ humanitarian aid workers,¹⁰ police officers,¹¹ informants,¹² former members of terrorist groups,¹³ and various vulnerable or target communities.¹⁴ Australia,¹⁵ United Kingdom,¹⁶ Canada,¹⁷ Pakistan,¹⁸ and Nigeria¹⁹ emerged as the primary geographic contexts for these investigative efforts. Primary archival research mostly consisted of historical and contextual analysis of court cases,²⁰ counterterrorism campaigns and policies,²¹ and other archival research methods.²² Indonesia²³ and Canada²⁴ were the most frequently used countries for primary archival research.

A small number of literature (3%) employs other qualitative methods, such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)²⁵ and Mobilities Design Thinking approach.²⁶ It is important to note that several studies also included analysis of multiple qualitative methods. Table 1 presents a summary of qualitative research methods on counterterrorism literature.

Qualitative Method	Count	% of All Literature Pieces
Case Studies (secondary sources only)	86	45
Case Studies (interviews & field work)	45	23
Case Studies (primary archival research)	10	5
Other	5	3

Table 1: Qualitative Methodologies in the Study of Counterterrorism

⁶ For example: Burgess (2016).

⁷ For example: Monaghan (2022).

⁸ For example: Iwuoha (2019).

⁹ For example: McNeil-Willson (2021).

¹⁰ For example: Jacobsen (2021).

¹¹ For example: Perito & Parvez (2014).

¹² For example: Matchett (2017).

¹³ For example: McNeil-Willson (2023).

¹⁴ For example: Cherney (2018).

¹⁵ For example: Morag (2023).

¹⁶ For example: McNeil-Willson (2023).

¹⁷ For example: Monaghan (2022).

¹⁸ For example: Hussain & Zahra-Malik (2014).

¹⁹ For example: Moorthy et al. (2020).

²⁰ For example: Kibret (2017).

²¹ For example: Wicaksa & Aftah (2023).

²² For example: Brankamp & Glück (2022).

²³ For example: Satria & Sumpter (2022).

²⁴ For example: Carver (2018).

²⁵ For example: O'Farrell (2022).

²⁶ Trandberg & Jensen (2023).

Quantitative research within the published counterterrorism literature encompasses a diverse range of methodologies and approaches. Table 2 summarizes the quantitative methods employed in published counterterrorism literature.

Use of descriptive statistics only is present in about 10 percent of all published counterterrorism literature.²⁷ Count models, such as Poisson²⁸ and Negative Binomial,²⁹ are applied in 8 percent of all studies, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)³⁰ and Fixed Effects³¹ models appear in 6 percent. Less commonly used methods include Logit, Probit, or Tobit³² models at 5 percent, Time Series Models³³ at 5 percent, and Survival/Event Analysis³⁴ at 2 percent. Interestingly, quasi-experimental methods, such as matching or difference-in-differences, that scholars have increasingly turned to in the context of COIN, were used only in one study.³⁵ Simulations and Agent Based Modeling approaches were not used in any published literature in our sample. Other statistical methods, including Competing Risks, ANOVA, T-test, Mediation analysis, Stepwise analysis, Summary Path analysis, Factor analysis, and others³⁶ constitute approximately 9 percent of all published counterterrorism literature. Among the 56 quantitative studies examined in this analysis, 44 utilized existing or secondary datasets, including resources such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),³⁷ the BAADI dataset,³⁸ and datasets from Jones and Libicki (2006, 2008),³⁹ among others. Thirteen studies relied on original datasets developed by the researchers.⁴⁰

Quantitative Method	Count	% of All Literature Pieces
Logit, Probit or Tobit	9	5
OLS and Fixed Effects Models	12	6
Time Series Models	10	5
Survival/Event Analysis	4	2
Count Models (e.g., Poisson, Negative Binomial)	15	8
Descriptive Statistics	19	10
Other Statistical Models (e.g., Competing Risks, ANOVA, T-test, matching or difference-in-differences, etc.)	18	9

Table 2: Quantitative Methodologies in the Study of Counterterrorism

²⁷ For example: Abozaid (2020), Njoku (2021), Carter (2020).

²⁸ For example: Danzell & Zidek (2013), Gil-Alana & Barros (2010).

²⁹ For example: Chenoweth & Dugan (2012), Aksoy (2018).

³⁰ For example: Lehrke & Schomaker (2016), Cherney & Murphy (2017), Phillips (2019).

³¹ For example: Schwartz et al. (2022).

³² For example: Kearns (2020).

³³ For example: Shahzad et al. (2019), Ciftci & Kula (2015).

³⁴ For example: Carson (2014).

³⁵ Ibrahim Shire (2023).

³⁶ For example: Williamson & Murphy (2022), Omenma & Hendricks (2018), Boutton (2014).

³⁷ For example: Rehman et al. (2017).

³⁸ For example: Asal & Young (2012).

³⁹ For example: Boutton (2014), Phillips (2019).

⁴⁰ For example: Dahl (2011), Price (2012).

What is Explained—CT-Relevant Dependent Variables

Existing research on government responses to terrorism addresses dependent variables—i.e., variables that measure the outcome of some intervention, factor, or set of factors—that fall into seven categories.⁴¹ They include: 1) security; 2) socio-political-economic factors involving the state; 3) socio-political-economic factors involving the public/individual 4) duration of conflicts 5) CT outcomes 6) the sustainability of CT practices and 7) other. Security factors focus most commonly on explaining how CT measures impact changes in the number of terrorist attacks,⁴² changes in those attacks depending on the target,⁴³ the number of casualties from terrorism, and the probability of averting terrorist plots.⁴⁴ Research that examines the design and implementation of CT measures that focus exclusively on security-relevant aspects also fall into this category. Such research includes, for example, studies that explain variation in government responses in the operational realm⁴⁵ or government’s adoption of a heavy-handed CT approach.⁴⁶

Socio-political-economic factors at the state level explore the development of state institutions (nonmilitary) as part of CT, and include, for example, an analysis of the decision to reform a state’s antiterrorism laws to match international norms⁴⁷ or the legalization of torture as part of CT.⁴⁸ Socio-political-economic factors at the population/individual level include the dependent variables the explore the success or failure of CT initiatives aimed at the public such as deradicalization programs⁴⁹ or limiting property loss from terrorist attacks because of CT,⁵⁰ the type of initiatives undertaken that affect the public/individual such as adopting refoulement of refugees as a response to terrorism,⁵¹ and the variation in public attitudes towards socio-political and economic issues such as perceptions of state actors’ legitimacy.⁵² These also include studies that examine the public’s impact on implementing CT measures.⁵³

Studies also focus on conflict duration. In this context, they examine the impact of CT measures on reducing the number of years it takes for terrorist organizations to die⁵⁴ or the number of days until the next terrorist attack.⁵⁵ Another category, CT outcomes, focuses on the overall success or failure of a specific operation or policies and is mostly found in qualitative research. This type of dependent variable does not provide a specific measure of success/effectiveness instead studies with such variables refer more broadly to countering terrorism or reducing terrorism.⁵⁶ The final category of dependent variables, CT sustainability, includes research that explores the impact of government responses to terrorism in the long run. Here a study would explicitly frame its focus as not only on the effectiveness of government efforts to reduce terrorist attacks but also on whether that outcome is

⁴¹ We grouped every dependent variable into one of seven general categories. For variables that were not explicitly noted as dependent variables, we inferred those variables. This was mostly the case for qualitative pieces.

⁴² For example: Boutton (2014).

⁴³ For example: Lehre et al. (2016).

⁴⁴ For example: Dahl (2011).

⁴⁵ For example: Perliger (2012).

⁴⁶ For example: Trauthig (2021).

⁴⁷ For example: Raza et al. (2021).

⁴⁸ For example: Stahl (2010).

⁴⁹ For example: Demant et al. (2010).

⁵⁰ For example: Kallandranis et al. (2012).

⁵¹ For example: Mwangi (2019).

⁵² For example: Cherney et al. (2017).

⁵³ For example: Huq et al. (2011).

⁵⁴ For example: Price (2012).

⁵⁵ For example: Carson (2014).

⁵⁶ For example: Sharma (2012).

sustained in the long run.⁵⁷ We also include a category for “Other” to capture variables that did not fit into one of the main categories. For example, China's reluctance to designate Pakistani citizens or organizations as terrorist under UN’s Security Council rules⁵⁸ or a state’s decision to choose either to defend itself against terrorism, directly intervene to target it, or outsource the targeting to a foreign ally⁵⁹ might fall into this bucket.

For each piece of literature in the database, we extracted every unique dependent variable contained within a publication and assigned it to one of the categories detailed above. This process resulted in the identification of 307 dependent variables. Table 3 shows the literature’s interest in the seven categories of dependent variables. Within this sample, the literature’s most dominant focus is on security (43% of all variables). The next largest group of dependent variables are those related to the “other” category (19.2% of all variables) followed by sociopolitical-economic factors involving the population (15.3% of all variables) and CT outcome (14.3% of all variables). The most surprising finding is the dearth of research exploring the presence or absence—or the success or failure of—sociopolitical-economic initiatives undertaken at the state level. Indeed, dependent variables relevant to state capacity building make up only 3.3 percent of all variables. Focus on the duration of conflicts is also limited, with only 4.2 percent of all variables exploring some aspect of time related to terrorist attacks or the demise of a terrorist organizations. Finally, interest in CT sustainability is almost nonexistent as less than one percent of all variables explore long-term effects of the governments’ responses.

Distribution of Dependent Variables Across Categories	
Dependent Variable Category	% of Dependent Variables
<i>Security</i> (e.g., number of terrorist attacks, number of casualties from terrorist attacks)	43.0
<i>CT outcome</i> (e.g., CT success/failure; terrorism reduction-broadly defined)	14.3
<i>Socio-political-economic factors involving the public/individual</i> (e.g., public opinion towards the government/insurgents; deradicalization programs)	15.3
<i>Socio-political-economic factors involving the state</i> (e.g., reform of antiterrorism laws; legalization of torture)	3.3
<i>Sustainability of CT</i>	0.7

⁵⁷ For example: Shad et al. (2020).

⁵⁸ Verma (2020).

⁵⁹ Garcia Alonso (2016).

(e.g., effectiveness of a CT response in the long run)	
<i>Duration of conflict</i> (e.g., time it takes for a terrorist organization to die; time until the next attack)	4.2
<i>Other</i> (e.g., state’s decision to outsource targeting or defend itself; state’s reluctance to consider an actor a terrorist organization)	19.2

Table 3: Distribution of Dependent Variables Across Categories

What is the Cause—CT-Relevant Independent Variables

There are 12 main categories of independent variables that we identified in our sample of CT literature (Table 4). These include 1) exploring the role of tactics such as relying on ideological rehabilitation of terrorist organizations’ members and their families⁶⁰ or using torture,⁶¹ 2) adaptability in conflict or innovation that may include, for example, the speed with which the government becomes familiar with the local population to gather intelligence⁶² or its reliance on technology,⁶³ 3) military capability of the government that includes, for example, a state’s military expenditures,⁶⁴ 4) doctrine/strategy development exemplified by the analysis of how using targeted killing as part of larger strategy rather than a stand-alone tactic contributes to the effectiveness of targeted killing in CT,⁶⁵ 5) external interventions that include both military and non-military ones, for example, the provision of military, defense, and economic aid by the U.S. to a state that experiences terrorist attacks,⁶⁶ 6) organizational structure/unity of effort that may include, for example, disunity between federal government and its states in CT approach,⁶⁷ 7) cognitive/psychological factors, with focus on individual beliefs/perceptions, such as perceiving the Muslim community as threatening,⁶⁸ 8) relationship between the host state and third-party external intervener, a category that explores coordination and implementation of activities between the two actors and/or agreements related to CT,⁶⁹ 9) culture that may include, for example, accepted societal norms regarding insurgent organizations and the populations they represent⁷⁰ or focus on religious identity,⁷¹ 10) leadership, a category of variables that explores the impact of weak/strong state leaders (either heads of state or leaders in charge of specific CT-relevant agencies),⁷² 11) public support for the government’s initiatives and/or for terrorists that includes, for example, public support of police work in CT.⁷³

⁶⁰ Jerard (2012).

⁶¹ Mialon et al. (2012).

⁶² Mir (2018).

⁶³ Cornish (2010).

⁶⁴ Perliger et al. (2018).

⁶⁵ Frankel (2011).

⁶⁶ For example: Boutoon (2014).

⁶⁷ Shah (2013).

⁶⁸ Williamson et al. (2022).

⁶⁹ Bapat (2011).

⁷⁰ Chowdhury et al. (2010).

⁷¹ For example: Piombo and Englebert (2022).

⁷² For example: Khan (2023).

⁷³ Huq et al. (2011).

There are also pieces that fall into the “other” category, and these include variables that either do not fit into any of the above categories or are indirectly connected to the state’s use of various levers of power but may nevertheless impact the state’s ability to target terrorists. For example, consider a study that analyzes the effectiveness of high value targeting of terrorists by governments. While several of the study’s independent variables consider the role of specific tactics in such targeting, including the use of indigenous forces, the study also includes a variable called “level of centralization of targeted opponent.”⁷⁴ While this variable is not directly related to any aspects of the state and its levers of power, it is included in our count as relevant because levels of enemy’s centralization can impact a state’s operational approach, which in turn can affect the success of terrorist targeting.

We identified 500 unique independent variables and placed every variable into one of the above categories. Table 4 shows the literature’s interest in 12 categories of independent variables. The most dominant category is Tactics with 32.2 percent of all independent variables focusing on the government’s tactics in CT, followed by Other, which comprises variables that are indirectly connected to the state’s use of various levers of power in CT or that fall outside of the main categories (31.6% of all variables), External Interventions (7% of all variables), Culture (6.8% of all variables), Organizational Structure/Unity of Effort (5.6% of all variables), and Doctrine Development (5.2% of all variables). There is limited interest in the empirical literature in exploring the impact of Third-Party Intervener’s Relationship with the Government in CT, Public Opinion, Military Capability, Adaptability/Innovation, Cognitive/Psychological factors, and Leadership. Each of these buckets constituted less than 5 percent of all variables, with Leadership and Adaptability/Innovation studied the least (each representing only 1 percent of all variables).

Distribution of Independent Variables Across Categories in Empirical Studies	
Independent Variable Category	% of Independent Variables
<i>Tactics</i> (e.g., use of torture; rehabilitation programs for terrorists)	32.2
<i>Government’s military capability</i> (e.g., state’s military expenditures; possession of specific weapons such as drones)	2.6
<i>Adaptability/Innovation</i> (e.g., the speed with which the government becomes familiar with local population; reliance on technology)	1.0
<i>Doctrine development</i> (e.g., use of a tactic with strategic goals in mind; salience of Western constructs of terrorism in another state’s CT doctrine)	5.2

⁷⁴ Frankel (2011).

<i>External intervention</i> (e.g., provision of economic aid; military intervention)	7.0
<i>Organizational structure and unity of effort</i> (e.g., disunity between central government and regions; cooperation challenges among states related to CT)	5.6
<i>Cognitive/psychological factors</i> (e.g., perceptions; commitment to CT)	2.4
<i>Third-party intervener-government relations</i> (e.g., affinity between the intervener and the host state; disagreements between intervener and host state about CT strategy)	1.4
<i>Public support</i> (e.g., public support of police work in CT; public consensus on the war on terrorism)	3.2
<i>Culture</i> (e.g., societal norms regarding terrorist organizations; religious importance to the population)	6.8
<i>Leadership</i> (e.g., strong/weak leader type; quality of policy leadership)	1.0
<i>Other</i> (variables that do not fall into any of the above categories, e.g., challenges in penetrating minority communities; or variables that capture indirect connection to state use of military power; e.g., level of centralization of targeted opponent)	31.6

Table 4: Distribution of Independent Variables Across Categories in Empirical Studies

Levers of Power

Type and the Extent of Focus

Research investigating global responses to terrorism predominantly centers around the state’s law enforcement and military levers of power, as shown in Figure 3. At the article level (n=192), we find that 58 percent of published literature engages in analysis relevant to the military, and 58 percent focus on law enforcement.⁷⁵ An illustrative example of the use of law enforcement as a lever of power in counterterrorism policy includes a study of counterterrorism law and policy across the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. In this analysis, the governments of all three nations rely heavily on law enforcement agencies, counterterrorism legislation, detention, and investigative methods in their

⁷⁵ Several studies are coded for multiple levers of power if they address distinct mechanisms within their analyses.

counterterrorism strategies.⁷⁶ The government’s use of the military lever of power is exemplified in a study that examines the impact of increasing U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan on decreases in terrorist violence.⁷⁷ Analysis of the intelligence lever of power is found in 32 percent of all publications in our sample. A study of how the New York Police Department’s intelligence program has helped to prevent terrorist attacks since 9/11 illustrates the use of this type of source of power in CT.⁷⁸

The scholarly literature has explored “softer” levers of power less frequently in the study of CT. Government’s diplomatic levers of power are present in about 23 percent of all counterterrorism studies. An illustrative example is a study analyzing the impact of Israeli peace negotiations with the Palestinians on the number of terrorist attacks.⁷⁹ The use of information and narrative as a lever of power in counterterrorism was identified in 22 percent of the literature. It includes, for example, an exploration of how the United Kingdom strategically deployed narratives to develop a holistic counterterrorism strategy, UK CONTEST, with focus on terrorist propaganda and public perceptions, among others.⁸⁰ Fourteen percent of the published pieces focused on governance-related activities designed to improve institutional efficacy and legitimacy. A piece that examines the creation of Poland’s Center for Security (RCB) as a mechanism to manage crisis situations, including terrorist attacks, is an example of this type of research.⁸¹ The development lever of power, which focuses on enhancing the capacity of recipient entities, was identified in 12 percent of the literature. For example, one study analyzes the impact of U.S. development aid to Pakistan on reducing the number of terrorist attacks.⁸² Financial source of state power, encompassing the control of financial systems and the seizure of assets as deterrents to terrorism, are present in around 10 percent of the literature. An article that examines the challenge of using antiterrorism finance laws in curtailing ISIS’s financial networks illustrates states’ use of financial lever of power.⁸³ Finally, economic levers of power, including macroeconomic policy, trade policy, and foreign aid, represent the smallest proportion of the counterterrorism literature, accounting for just 6 percent of all studies in our sample. For example, one research analyzes the change in U.S. provision of economic assistance to Kenya post 9/11 to fight global terrorism.⁸⁴ Overall, this analysis suggests that governments predominantly rely on traditional tools and institutions—such as military and law enforcement—in their counterterrorism strategies, which is in line with how states have managed their security threats historically.

⁷⁶ Morag (2023).

⁷⁷ Dayaratna et al. (2023).

⁷⁸ Dahl (2011).

⁷⁹ Chenoweth and Dugan (2012).

⁸⁰ Glazzard and Reed (2020).

⁸¹ Gasztold and Gasztold (2022).

⁸² Shahzad et al. (2019).

⁸³ Bouzis (2015).

⁸⁴ Aronson (2011).




Figure 3: The Extent of Literature’s Focus on Different Levers of Power

Lever of Power across Geographic Units

Table 5 illustrates the distribution of research literature that addresses various levers of power across different geographical units. The information lever of power is most explored at the single country level followed by multiple countries in multiple regions. This source of power, however, is the only one that has not been analyzed at the global level. Research that examines financial sources of power tends to do so in the context of a single country followed by multiple countries in a single region. However, we did not find any study in our sample that considered state use of financial means as a CT approach at the sub-national level, while every other lever of power was studied at this level. The diplomatic lever of power and the governance lever of power are both investigated predominantly in a single country followed by multiple countries in multiple regions. Economic lever of power is mostly studied in the context of a single country followed by equal concentration on multiple countries in multiple regions and on global analysis. Interest in exploring the role of development is mostly found in studies looking at one country followed by multiple countries in a single region.

When it comes to research that explores more traditional, hard power, we find that when studies focus on the military lever of power they tend to do so mostly in the context of a single country followed by multiple countries in multiple regions while law enforcement is also explored through a single-country focus followed by equal focus on multiple countries in a single region and multiple countries in multiple regions. Lastly, the intelligence lever of power is investigated mostly in a single-country context followed by the analysis of multiple countries in a single region.

	Diplomatic	Information	Military	Economic	Financial	Intelligence	Law Enforcement	Development	Governance
Subnational in a single country	4.44%	11.90%	7.21%	9.09%	0.00%	8.20%	8.04%	4.35%	7.41%
Single Country	48.89%	59.52%	46.85%	45.45%	55.00%	39.34%	50.00%	65.22%	70.37%
Multiple Countries in a Single Region	20.00%	9.52%	14.41%	0.00%	25.00%	19.67%	15.18%	17.39%	7.41%
Multiple Countries in Multiple Regions	24.44%	16.67%	17.12%	18.18%	10.00%	18.03%	15.18%	8.70%	11.11%
Global	2.22%	0.00%	11.71%	18.18%	5.00%	13.11%	9.82%	4.35%	3.70%
No Specific Focus	0.00%	2.38%	2.70%	9.09%	5.00%	1.64%	1.79%	0.00%	0.00%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

All observations at the hypothesis/research question level.
Multiple regions refer to DoD combatant commands

Table 5: Levers of Power Across Geographic Units

Target

An essential part of our analysis concerns the type of target of counterterrorism strategies. They include state targets and non-state targets. We differentiate among the four types of actors when discussing specific state actor populations within counterterrorism research. State targets included in our analysis comprise political entities, the military, economic institutions, and the public (Figure 4). Studies that examine state targeting of political entities or institutions of the state (40% of all pieces) and the public of the state facing terrorist threats (35% of all pieces) are the most frequently analyzed in our literature sample, followed by targeting the state's military (31% of all pieces). There is considerably less interest in the literature in focusing on how the state reforms its economic institutions as part of CT (9% of all pieces).




Figure 4: State Targets in Counterterrorism Literature

Non-state targets of counterterrorism research and strategies include formal leadership of non-state target groups, members of non-state target groups, sympathizers but not members of non-state target groups, and constituents of non-state target groups. Figure 5 represents a summary of non-state targets within the context of published literature on counterterrorism. Our analysis shows a dominant emphasis in the literature on examining CT responses targeting members of non-state groups (61% of all pieces) and leadership of such groups (53% of all pieces), reflecting a significant focus on how governments disrupt the operational capacity of terrorist organizations by addressing their active participants. Forty-five percent of all pieces explored responses that targeted sympathizers, while 41 percent of the studies concentrated on constituents. The focus on sympathizers and constituents is relatively lower and may suggest a slightly secondary emphasis on researching how governments undermine ideological support and legitimacy.




Figure 5: Non- State Targets in Counterterrorism Literature

Research Gaps

Our analysis of empirical studies on government responses to terrorism points to several areas for improvement in future research. The following section delineates methodological and substantive aspects that merit consideration.

Methodology and Conceptualization

First, the literature places greater emphasis on exploring relationships between variables based on qualitative case study analysis while the use of statistical models on larger data samples is less common. As only 13 percent of all articles analyzed in this study relied on such models, the generalizability of existing insights is limited. Furthermore, most of those studies turned to existing data sets for analysis. Future studies would benefit from the analysis of large data samples, especially in a global context, and from new data collections. For example, one data collection that might be emulated is that of repressive and conciliatory CT efforts by the Israeli government toward the Palestinian terrorist targets and civilians, the Government Actions in a Terrorist Environment-Israel (GATE-Israel) dataset.⁸⁵ This data sets provides comprehensive insights on the tactics and policies from 1984-2004, rating each action on a seven-point conciliatory-repression scale. Similar data collections could be undertaken that focus on states other than Israel.

Second, while the literature attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of government CT responses by considering structural factors, such as initial public support of terrorist organizations prior to responses, the report suggests additional research that relies on dynamic simulations to capture the multi-faceted aspect of some CT responses to better gauge their impact. A useful study to consider might be one that used quantitative dynamic systems modeling in the context of

⁸⁵ Chenoweth and Dugan (2012).

counterinsurgency⁸⁶—a study we emphasized in our past report—to show the interplay between kinetic operations, intelligence gathering, legitimacy, quantity of troops deployed, and timing of missions to identify conditions that are most conducive for reducing blowback from kinetic operations over time. Similar approach could be used with combinations of CT tactics to explore the optimal way to manage shifts in tactics and sequencing.

Third, for qualitative research, the report suggests more precision in the development of conceptualization related to independent and dependent variables. Many qualitative studies required our researchers to infer the independent and dependent variables and relevant measurements. Without explicit measurement of variables, it is challenging to assess the studies' evidence and to compare insights across different articles as it may not be clear whether a variable such as reduction in terrorism means the same thing to different researchers. This lack of precision can undermine internal and external validity. A recommendation is that studies with qualitative methodology include research design sections that outline key variables, definitions, and measurement in a way that is done in most quantitative studies.

Substantive Areas

First, existing research is mostly focused on how states use military and law enforcement in CT while considerably understudied is the analysis of economic and developmental approaches aimed at general populations. This runs in stark contrast, for example, to research on government responses in the context of insurgencies where the use of development-related tactics was the second most studied lever of power. While studies focus on the impact of foreign development assistance⁸⁷ and U.S. economic aid⁸⁸ in the context of CT, limited attention is given to the government's own efforts to win the hearts and minds of vulnerable populations that may be susceptible to recruitment by militant organizations through specific activities aimed at such groups. As many terrorist organizations that have been around for years, including the PKK and Hezbollah, operate like insurgents⁸⁹ in that they espouse political goals and have their own broad support beyond the organization's formal ranks, delving more systematically into non-military and non-law enforcement tactics would be recommended. It may be useful, for example to examine the differences in the effectiveness of softer approaches based on whether the government is fighting groups that use terrorism domestically, globally, or both.

Second, the analysis shows that the sustainability of gains achieved through governmental responses is rarely studied. Instead, the dominant interest is in exploring the impact of such responses on the number of attacks, casualties, public support, and broadly defined outcome of success/failure. Yet such outcomes do not necessarily translate into durable peace. Furthermore, even the death of an organization need not automatically imply that the threat is gone in the long run. While an organization may be decimated it may still have underground support cells that may, in time, expand under ripe conditions.⁹⁰ Complicating the effort of researching sustainability is thus the challenge of identifying long-term success of CT practices. Future research might consider collecting data that differentiates between operational gains and long-term strategic success. The latter should factor in not only the demise of a terrorist organization but also improvements in support for the government from such organization's former constituents and sympathizers.

⁸⁶ Anderson (2011).

⁸⁷ For example: Shahzad (2019).

⁸⁸ Ibid (2019).

⁸⁹ Byman (2007).

⁹⁰ Price (2012).

Finally, the impact of leadership, adaptability, and innovation in CT responses is understudied as the literature emphasizes the analysis of specific tactics. The October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas have shown that terrorist organizations' ability to innovate and adapt can be underestimated by governments. As such, governments may fail to recognize and adapt their own CT responses to those of the enemy. In an era of rapid advances in technology and growing ease of access to such technology for non-state actors, we find a significant gap in research on the evolution of CT responses, how such change happens, whether it involves tactical and/or strategic shifts, and the subsequent consequences of those shifts.

Leaders often drive innovation and play a vital role in determining tactical and strategic goals as well as setting the tone for organizational culture and morale. Recent research on private military and security companies' operations in Iraq has shown that whether an organization has a leader with a military or non-military background can impact how aggressively it pursues its tactics against non-state actors in insurgencies.⁹¹ Yet systematic research on leadership traits, background and management styles is missing specifically in the context of government responses to terrorist activities carried out domestically and transnationally. Sometimes CT policy can be multi-faceted and include the involvement of various agencies, each with its own leadership. Studies might explore the role of such leaders and/or focus on the traits of national leaders in contributing to CT effectiveness.

⁹¹ Radziszewski (2023).

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Appendix: Literature Coding Guide

Each piece of literature will begin with a single row. Extractors may add additional rows, as needed, to properly reflect the number of research questions and/or hypotheses associated with a publication.

Identification Variables

1. **Extractor** (Extractor Name): Text entry. Enter your name to “claim” the work for extraction.
2. **Key**: Alphanumeric. Unique ID linked to Zotero.
3. **Publication Type**: Text. From Zotero.
4. **Publication Year**: YYYY. From Zotero
5. **Author**: Text. From Zotero
6. **Publication Title**: Text. From Zotero

Research Questions & Hypotheses

7. **RQ** (Research Question): Text entry.
 - Record the research question from the publication
 - If there are multiple research questions, add additional rows(s) for each question.
 - If there are no research questions explicitly stated, but one or more research questions can be inferred, enter the inferred research question followed by the text (inferred).
8. **H** (Hypothesis): Text entry.
 - Record the hypothesis associated with the research question
 - If there are multiple hypotheses, add additional row(s).
 - If there are multiple hypotheses but they are “mirrors” (i.e., the same relationship is hypothesized to be both negative and positive, based on different theoretical considerations), enter as a single hypothesis.
 - If no hypotheses are explicitly stated, but one or more can be inferred, enter the inferred hypotheses followed by the text, (inferred). For example, Leadership decapitation has a positive impact on reducing the number of terrorist attacks. (inferred)

Variables

What variables (qualitative or quantitative) are included in the analysis to test the hypothesis? If you are inferring variables, enter **-99** for the fields below and follow instructions in the “Inferred Variables” section.

9. **VARDEP** (Dependent variable): text entry. Brief description of the variable and proxy variables that might be used to capture it.
10. **VARIND** (Independent variable): text entry. Brief description of the variable and proxy variables that might be used to capture it.
11. **VARCON** (Control variables): text entry. Brief description of the variable(s) and proxy variable(s) that might be used to capture it.
 - If there are no control variables, enter **-99**.

Inferred Variables

For articles that don’t specifically mention their variables and you need to infer them based on the article’s core focus, enter text and follow the same rules as above. If you **did not** infer any variables, enter **-99** for each field.

12. **VARDEPINFER** (see rules above for VARDEP)

- Inferred dependent variable(s). Enter description of the variable(s).
- 13. **VARINDEPINFER** (see rules above for VARIND)
 - Inferred independent variable(s). Enter the description of the variable(s).
- 14. **VARCONINFER** (see rules above for VARCON)
 - Inferred control variable(s). Use syntax for **INDV** above.

Methodological Information

- 15. **DATA:** text entry. Enter any data sets used (for QUAN or quantitative pieces), including which variables relate to each data set.
- 16. **FINDING:** text entry. Provide explanation of key findings related to the hypothesis and/or research questions.

Method of analysis: What method(s) are used to test the hypothesis being coded?

- 17. **QUAL** (Qualitative): Y/N
- 18. **QUALDES** (Qualitative Method Description): Text entry for specific method(s). Enter -99 if you entered N for QUAL.
- 19. **QUAN** (Quantitative): Y/N
- 20. **QUANDES** (Quantitative Method Description): Text entry for specific method(s). Enter -99 if you entered N for QUAN.
- 21. **MATHMOD** (Formal mathematical modeling): Y/N
- 22. **MATHMODDES** (Formal mathematical modeling description): Text entry for specific method(s). Enter -99 if you entered N for MATHMOD.

Temporal coverage

- 23. **START** (Start Year): YYYY entry. For pieces with no stated temporal focus, enter -99.
- 24. **END** (End Year): YYYY entry. For pieces with no stated temporal focus, enter -99.

Geographic Coverage

- 25. **GEOSCOPE** (Scope of geographic coverage): The main focus of counterterrorism, should be the country where counterterrorism operations are taking place.
 1. Subnational in a single country
 2. Single Country
 3. Multiple countries in a single region (defined as DOD region)
 4. Multiple countries in multiple regions (defined as DOD region)
 5. Global
- 26. **UNGEO** ([UN Geographic Subregion](#)): Y/N for each region
 - 015 Northern Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara)
 - 014 Eastern Africa (British India Ocean Territory, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, French Southern Territories, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe)
 - 017 Middle Africa (Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe)
 - 018 Southern Africa (Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa)
 - 011 Western Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo)
 - 029 Caribbean (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto

- Rico, Saint Barthelemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands)
- 013 Central America (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama)
- 005 South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela)
- 021 Northern America (Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, United States of America)
- 010 Antarctica
- 143 Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)
- 030 Eastern Asia (China, China-Hong Kong, China-Macao, North Korea, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea)
- 035 Southeastern Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar/Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam)
- 034 Southern Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)
- 145 Western Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Yemen)
- 151 Eastern Europe (Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine)
- 154 Northern Europe (Aland Islands, Channel Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Sweden, UK)
- 039 Southern Europe (Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Kosovo, Malta, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain)
- 155 Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland)
- 009 Oceania (American Samoa, Australia, Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Heard and McDonalds Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna Islands, U.S. Minor Outlying Islands)
- 99 No specific geographic focus (for quantitative pieces doing global analysis)

27. DODGEO (DOD Combatant Command AOR): Y/N for each region

1. **AFRICOM** (Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe)
2. **CENTCOM** (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Iran, Turkmenistan, Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan)
3. **EUCOM** (Albania, Germany, Montenegro, Andorra, Greece, Netherlands, Armenia, Holy See (the Vatican), Norway, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Azerbaijan, Iceland, Portugal, Belarus, Ireland, Romania, Belgium, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, San Marino, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia, Latvia, Slovakia, Cyprus,

Lichtenstein, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Spain, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, Estonia, Macedonia, Switzerland, Finland, Malta, Turkey, France, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Monaco, United Kingdom)

4. **INDOPACOM** (American Samoa, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Heard and McDonalds Islands, Hawaii, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, North Korea, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timore-Leste, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Wallis and Futuna Islands, U.S. Minor Outlying Islands, Philippines)
 5. **NORTHCOM** (continental United States, Alaska, Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Turks and Caicos)
 6. **SOUTHCOM** (Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, U.S. Virgin Islands, Venezuela)
- 99 No specific geographic focus (e.g., in some theoretical and policy publications)

If there are **five or fewer** countries included in the analysis, please enter the relevant COW country code (list starts on next page) for each included country:

28. COUN1
29. COUN2
30. COUN3
31. COUN4
32. COUN5

StateNme	CCode	StateNme	CCode	StateNme	CCode
Afghanistan	700	Grenada	55	Panama	95
Albania	339	Guatemala	90	Papal States	327
Algeria	615	Guinea	438	Papua New Guinea	910
Andorra	232	Guinea-Bissau	404	Paraguay	150
Angola	540	Guyana	110	Parma	335
Antigua & Barbuda	58	Haiti	41	Peru	135
Argentina	160	Hanover	240	Philippines	840
Armenia	371	Hesse Electoral	273	Poland	290
Australia	900	Hesse Grand Ducal	275	Portugal	235
Austria	305	Honduras	91	Qatar	694
Austria-Hungary	300	Hungary	310	Republic of Vietnam	817
Azerbaijan	373	Iceland	395	Romania	360
Baden	267	India	750	Russia	365
Bahamas	31	Indonesia	850	Rwanda	517

Bahrain	692	Iran	630	Samoa	990
Bangladesh	771	Iraq	645	San Marino	331
Barbados	53	Ireland	205	Sao Tome and Principe	403
Bavaria	245	Israel	666	Saudi Arabia	670
Belarus	370	Italy	325	Saxony	269
Belgium	211	Ivory Coast	437	Senegal	433
Belize	80	Jamaica	51	Seychelles	591
Benin	434	Japan	740	Sierra Leone	451
Bhutan	760	Jordan	663	Singapore	830
Bolivia	145	Kazakhstan	705	Slovakia	317
Bosnia and Herzegovina	346	Kenya	501	Slovenia	349
Botswana	571	Kiribati	946	Solomon Islands	940
Brazil	140	Korea	730	Somalia	520
Brunei	835	Kosovo	347	South Africa	560
Bulgaria	355	Kuwait	690	South Korea	732
Burkina Faso	439	Kyrgyzstan	703	South Sudan	626
Burundi	516	Laos	812	Spain	230
Cambodia	811	Latvia	367	Sri Lanka	780
Cameroon	471	Lebanon	660	St. Kitts and Nevis	60
Canada	20	Lesotho	570	St. Lucia	56
Cape Verde	402	Liberia	450	St. Vincent & Grenadines	57
Central African Republic	482	Libya	620	Sudan	625
Chad	483	Liechtenstein	223	Suriname	115
Chile	155	Lithuania	368	Swaziland	572
China	710	Luxembourg	212	Sweden	380
Colombia	100	Luxembourg	212	Switzerland	225
Comoros	581	Macedonia	343	Syria	652
Congo	484	Madagascar	580	Taiwan	713
Costa Rica	94	Malawi	553	Tajikistan	702
Croatia	344	Malaysia	820	Tanzania	510
Cuba	40	Maldives	781	Thailand	800
Cyprus	352	Mali	432	Togo	461
Czech Republic	316	Malta	338	Tonga	955
Czechoslovakia	315	Marshall Islands	983	Trinidad and Tobago	52
Dem Republic of the Congo	490	Mauritania	435	Tunisia	616
Denmark	390	Mauritius	590	Turkey	640
Djibouti	522	Mecklenburg Schwerin	280	Turkmenistan	701

Dominica	54	Mexico	70	Tuscany	337
Dominican Republic	42	Modena	332	Tuvalu	947
East Timor	860	Moldova	359	Two Sicilies	329
Ecuador	130	Monaco	221	Uganda	500
Egypt	651	Mongolia	712	Ukraine	369
El Salvador	92	Montenegro	341	United Arab Emirates	696
Equatorial Guinea	411	Morocco	600	United Kingdom	200
Eritrea	531	Mozambique	541	USA	2
Estonia	366	Myanmar	775	Uruguay	165
Ethiopia	530	Namibia	565	Uzbekistan	704
Federated States of Micronesia	987	Nauru	970	Vanuatu	935
Fiji	950	Nepal	790	Venezuela	101
Finland	375	Netherlands	210	Vietnam	816
France	220	New Zealand	920	Wuerttemberg	271
Gabon	481	Nicaragua	93	Yemen	679
Gambia	420	Niger	436	Yemen Arab Republic	678
Georgia	372	Nigeria	475	Yemen People's Republic	680
German Democratic Republic	265	North Korea	731	Yugoslavia	345
German Federal Republic	260	Norway	385	Zambia	551
Germany	255	Oman	698	Zanzibar	511
Ghana	452	Pakistan	770	Zimbabwe	552
Greece	350	Palau	986		

Target

Target population if target is a state actor:

- 33. **MIL** (military): Y/N
- 34. **POL** (political): Y/N
- 35. **ECON** (economic): Y/N
- 36. **GEN** (general population): Y/N

Target population if target is a non-state actor:

- 37. **LEAD** (leadership, target is part of the formal leadership of the non-state target group): Y/N
- 38. **MEMBER** (members, target is a member of the non-state target group): Y/N
- 39. **SYMP** (sympathizers, target are sympathizers but not members of a non-state target group): Y/N
- 40. **CONSTIT** ((constituents, target is the population the non-state target group claims to represent): Y/N

Source of Power

Indicate the dominant source of power that a state uses as part of counterterrorism

41. **D** (Diplomatic, the use of negotiation and dialogue and resulting treaties or policies to advance interests): Y/N
42. **DDES** (Description of diplomatic tactics): Text entry.
43. **IN** (Information, the deployment of information and narrative to shape events, strategies, and perceptions to advance interests): Y/N
44. **INDES** (Description of information tactics): Text entry.
45. **M** (Military, the coercive application or threat of force to compel): Y/N
46. **MDES** (Description of military tactics): Text entry.
47. **E** (Economic, the use of economic instruments and policies, including macroeconomic policy, trade policy, and foreign aid, to advance interests): Y/N
48. **EDES** (Description of economic tactics): Text entry.
49. **F** (Financial, involving the use of financial systems, either formal or informal, and typically the denial of access to such systems, to advance interests): Y/N
50. **FDES** (Description of financial tactics): Text entry.
51. **I** (Intelligence, the conversion of diverse data related to the environment, future capabilities and intention, and relevant actors into coherent information to allow decision advantage to advance interests): Y/N
52. **IDES** (Description of intelligence tactics): Text entry.
53. **L** (Law Enforcement, the use of international, foreign, or domestic legal frameworks and their enforcement to advance interests): Y/N
54. **LDES** (Description of law enforcement tactics): Text entry.
55. **DEV** (Development, activities designed to enhance the capacity of the recipient, typically but not exclusively the economic capacity): Y/N
56. **DEVDES** (Description of development tactics): Text entry.
57. **GOV** (Governance, activities designed to enhance the efficacy and legitimacy of institutions): Y/N
58. **GOVDES** (Description of governance tactics): Text entry.



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