Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD)

Codebook

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Big Allied and Dangerous Project History

The Big Allied and Dangerous I (BAAD1) has its roots in the summer of 2005 as a project led by Dr. Victor Asal and Dr. R. Karl Rethemeyer that sought to build a database containing organizational and network variables for modern terrorist groups. The two coders who performed this task were Ian Anderson and Nick Ference. The original collection contained data from 1998-2004.

Eventually enough data was gathered that Dr. Karl Rethemeyer was able to perform a network analysis on the relational data. The first examination was on the question of what factors led to increased lethality of terrorist organizations. Size and network connections were identified as two of the most important factors. Thus Big Allied and Dangerous became the name of this first dataset, which contained information on terrorist groups active in the period 1998-2005. Much of this research was funded through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence. However, the data available was not time-series and only provided one snapshot from 1998-2005 time period.

BAAD2, which began in January 2008, is the continuation of this project that seeks to provide time-series data by breaking out into yearly time slices for a ten year period from 1998-2007. BAAD2 also started fresh in terms of coding instead of drawing primarily on the semantic data from MIPT-TKB data. While relying on the list of terrorist organizations from MIPT-TKB data, the coding was done using multiple sources, primarily academic and news sources. BAAD2 adds two years onto the time period and includes many more variables than the original BAAD1. Due to the additional variables, time series nature, and expansion of data sources, the BAAD2 collection included an effort by more than two dozen coders over multiple years. BAAD3 is currently being collected and has added a number of violent non-state actors, variables and five additional years to the dataset.

BAAD Profiles Project

The Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) profiles project is an effort to turn the BAAD dataset into narrative profiles for each violent non-state actor. This format will allow the organizational and networking data to reach a wider audience and will provide additional information regarding the history, ideology, political activity and structure of these groups. The project began in 2014 with the 100 most lethal terrorist organizations in the Global Terrorism Database and will expand to capture all the non-state violent actors in the BAAD database. This project is an effort to replace START's Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) and is a joint Project on Violent Conflict (PVC) and START collaboration.

Organizational Level Variables

Organization Identification

I. Group (Primary Name of the Organization)

The organization's PRIMARY group name based on the TORG master list. Watch for aliases, and variations in transliteration or spelling. For example, there are multiple spellings for al-Qa'ida: al-Qaeda, the bin Laden Organization, al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida. However, it is important that you enter the PRIMARY group name into the code sheet, exactly as it appears on the TORGcode master list. For example, <u>Irish Republican Army</u> is not the same as <u>Irish Republican Army (IRA),</u> and the correct spelling is al-Qa'ida for our purposes.

II. TORG (Violent Non-State Organizational Identifier)

The TORG field is a unique numerical code that is assigned to each group.

III. Year (Year of data)

This field shows the year that you are coding. Some groups may only have one year of activity, others may be active the entire period of the data. If a new group is founded by two merging groups then code the year that the new group was founded. However, if a group is simply changing their name, then continue to code the founding year based on the first emergence of the group under their original name.

IV. Hbase (Organizational Homebase)

Enter the name of the country where the group is based. This can be thought of as the "main" base/area of operations, as many international violent non-state organizations operate in multiple countries. Therefore this may require some discretion. For example, although al-Qa'ida operates internationally, its homebase would be qualified as Afghanistan from 1998-2001 and then Pakistan after 2001.

V. Hb.ccode (Homebase Country Code)

The CCodes are unique identifier numbers for the country that will auto populate once you enter the homebase.

VI. Hb.ISO (ISO A3 Code)

The three-letter ISO code will auto populate based on the homebase country you enter.

VII. HB.ISO.CC

This is a numeric code for homebase that corresponds to the ISO code.

VIII. Age (Organizational Age)

The organization's age, measured in years, is how long a violent non-state organization has been in existence for the year coded. For example, in 1998 Abu Sayyaf Group would be seven years old, but in 2001 ASG would be ten years old. The year a group is founded should be coded zero (0).

IX. MARID (Minorities at Risk Identifier)

If the organization is an ethnic or religious minority group within their country, code the corresponding Minorities at Risk (MAR) ID from the coding reference list. The MARID must be based on the minority group and the homebase country. If the organization represents a specific ethnic or religious group that is not on the MARID list for a given country then please write in the ethnicity/religion. If the group is neither an ethnic nor religious minority, code variable as zero (0).

X. Organizational Ideology

Ideology is the guiding principle for the group and the closest thing to a group identity. Be on the watch as you code yearly variables for shifts or changes in ideology. For example, when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was founded it had a leftist ideology in addition to being a separatist organization. However, the leftist component of their ideology diminished over time until the group no longer adhered to a leftist rhetoric. These codes are not mutually exclusive and groups will often adhere to more than one ideology. Each of the following variables should be coded as follows:

0   Does not adhere to ideology
1   Adheres to ideology

Left (Leftist Organization)
The organization promotes economically leftist policies such as redistribution of wealth by the government and nationalization of industry. Most that fall into this category will primarily be communist and socialist organizations and their variants (Marxist, Leninist, Maoist). Examples include the New People's Army (NPA), the Red Brigades and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC).

Rght (Rightist Organization)
The organization promotes economically rightist policies such as extreme laissez-faire policies, small government, or policies that favor status quo economic elites. Often rightist groups are formed as a reaction to leftist groups, such as many anti-communist organizations in Central and South America. Examples include United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC) and Mountaineer Militia.

5

Reli (Religious Organization)
The organization is guided by some form of religious principles. They may seek to incorporate religious policies into public life or exist to protect a distinct religious group. Examples include al-Qa'ida, Jemaah Islamiya, Kach, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

Ethn (Ethnic Organization)
The organization represents a certain ethnic group and advocates for the rights or expansion of that ethnic group. Examples include Fatah, Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Sepa (Separatist Organization)
The organization advocates for the autonomy, independence, or annexation of a certain geographical area for a represented group. Often this ideology overlaps with religious or ethnic ideologies. Examples include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Envi (Environmentalist Organization)
The organization advocates policies for the conservation of environment or wildlife. Examples include the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), Animal Liberation Front (ALF), and Oxford Arson Group.

Supr (Supremacist Organization)
The organization advocates for the inherent supremacy of a specific race over other inherently inferior races. Some extreme nationalist groups reach this level as well. Examples include the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, and Russian National Unity.

Anar (Anarchist Organization)
The organization espouses anti-authority rhetoric and seeks to overthrow the government for the purpose of living in society without state control. Examples include Solidarity with 17N, Informal Anarchist Federation, and Anti-State Action.

Agzn (Anti-globalization Organization)
The organization espouses rhetoric that is against the globalization of countries around the world, often citing undue influences of the United States or "the West" in an oppressive global economy. These views are often coupled with anarchist or leftist ideologies. Examples include Revolutionary Nuclei and the Group of Carlo Giuliani.

Vigl (Vigilante Organization)
The organization holds a strong anti-crime goal, often speaking out against the government for not properly dealing with crime or attacking corrupt police. They often attempt to act as a neighborhood watch or illegitimate police force to fill this perceived void. An example is People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD).

Regca (Regime Change)
The organization's goal is for a change in the leadership of the country. This includes revolutionary organizations such as the Free Syrian Army.

No Ideology
This is a dummy variable input if the group does not have any specific ideology.

Organizational Characteristics

XI.   Size Inference

This variable indicates whether the researchers were able to find direct proof of the group's size for that year or if supervisors inferred the size based on the strength value of the group in subsequent or previous years. A value of 1 indicates the size was inferred.

XII.   Size (Organizational Size)

This variable is numerical range that categorizes the number of members in the organization. This variable is a reflection of the strength variable. Group membership fluctuates significantly over the lifespan of an organization, so it is particularly important that each source is specific for the year coded.

-99 Unknown (Use when there is no indication of group size in the sources)
1   1-9 Members
2   10-99 Members
3   100-999 Members
4   1,000-9,999 Members
5   10,000+ Members

Coder Note: When you find more than one different size number for the same year, you should code based on the following. Determine if you can find more sources that support one of the sources over the other. If you find three sources that have one size number and only one for the other, then code based on the size with more sources. If you cannot find articles supporting either size estimate and your sources are of equal quality, then you should code the size based on the most conservative (lowest) size estimate. Ex: The New York Times has an article in 2004 that says the group has 500 members, but the country reports on terrorism for 2004 list the group's size at 1,000 members. If you can't find any more size information for that year you should code size as 3, but then list the full range in (500-1,000) in the strength category.

XIII.   Strength (Organizational Strength)

In this field enter the actual number, approximation, or range of group size based on the sources. If sources list different number for one given year then input the value as a range that encompasses the various numbers. Examples include: 1200, 2000-3000, hundreds.

Coder Note: The following formatting should be used.
Approximately (number): generic for "around", "about", "estimates"
Greater than (number): for descriptions of "more than x members"
Greater than or equal to (number): for descriptions of "no less than x members"
Less than (number): for descriptions of "under/less then/fewer than x members"
Less than or equal to (number): for descriptions of "no more than x members"

XIV.   Ldrshp (Organizational Leadership)

-99 Unknown
0   Leaderless
     The organization has no defined leadership. These are most likely smaller groups that exist only as single cells or very loose networks with no defined leader or structure.

1   Multiple Leaders
     The organization has multiple leaders each with independent power to issue orders for the organization. This is most common in highly dispersed umbrella organizations although it can occur with other groups as well.

2   Governing Council
     Organization has multiple leaders who vote on orders using a governing body, which may be self-appointed or elected by general membership.

3   Hierarchical Leadership
     Organization has multiple leaders and is organized as a chain of command where ultimately the top leader has final power to issue/veto orders, but other leaders in the hierarchy may issue orders (usually tactical orders). This is the most common leadership structure. When articles only mention one leader, the coder should assume the structure is hierarchical rather than single leader.

4   Single Leader
     The organization has a single leader that controls the entire organization and is the only person able to issue orders for that organization. This is an uncommon structure. A single leader structure indicates that everyone in the group other than the leader is at exactly the same rank. Any groups with a second in command or different levels (local commanders or captains for carrying out operations) should be coded as hierarchical leadership (3). Generally this leadership style is most common of small cult-like groups with one individual as a charismatic centerpiece. In this leadership type, if the main leader were to die or quit, there wouldn't be a clear system for replacing him/her.

XV.   Terrctrl (Territorial Control)

Enter information on whether an organization controls territory of its own. This means the organization is able to control movement into, out of, or within a given territory. In some instances they will perform functions or provide services, similar to that of a legitimate government. Territory may be controlled by threat or use of force or if the government grants the organization the authority to do so. The territory must be a substantial area (city, region, etc) and not just an organization occupying a building or a couple of buildings. This excludes: military bases and checkpoints. Although these often indicate that the group does have control over territory, they may be operating from covert bases. So you need to do more research into whether the group is actually controlling any land. Additionally, the group must have control over the land for more than a few days. If they take over a town but then lose the territory back to government forces within a week then this does not count as territorial control.

Avoiding coding Unknown (-99) here. If you cannot find any evidence that the group controls territory then you should assume they do not, and code as zero. It generally takes a large and powerful group to control territory so if they do there will usually be news articles or reports about it.

-99   Unknown
0   Does not control territory
1   Controls territory

XVI.   Terrctrl.notes (Territorial Control Notes)

Use this space to describe the exact territory controlled: name, location, and size if available. Be as explicit and specific as the data you find. For example, this could be Camp Abubakar in Mindanao Philippines, areas FATA in Pakistan, camps in Western Bangladesh, Al-Badr I base in Jalalabad [34°25'00"N 70°27'00"E] is about 100 kilometers east of Kabul. If you cannot find more specific information than "parts of Afghanistan" then write that phrase exactly. Never write just a country name (ex: Indonesia) unless the group truly controls the entire country.

XVII.   Terrcntrl Inf (Territorial Control Inferences)

This variable includes direct proof of territorial control and additional group years that were inferred by researchers based on evidence that the group maintained control of areas within a specific region.

XVIII. Terrcntrl Inf Exp (Territorial Control Inference Explained)

This notes section contains a written description of the supervisors rationale for inferring the territorial control variable.

XIX.   Funding (Organizational Funding)

Enter the organization's methods of making money and financing their operations. Often multiple methods may be used, so if this is the case you should put a 1 for every financing type used by the group for that year. Avoid coding -99. If you cannot find any evidence of a group engaging in a specific funding type then you should assume they do not use that funding and code as zero. Use the coding scheme below:

-99   Unknown
0   Group does not engage in funding type
1   Group engages in funding type

Coder Note: Sometimes articles will describe the group as suspected of engaging in a certain financing type. For example an article may say "The group is suspected trafficking opium." This is not enough information to code without further evidence. The coder should engage in more in-depth research (ex: searching "(group name) AND opium" on lexis nexis). If no other evidence can be found then the coder should put -99 under drug trafficking for the relevant years and then make a note at the end of the coding sheet in the notes section that drug trafficking was suspected based off the specific source but the coder couldn't verify it.

Fd.drugtk (Drug Trafficking)
The group can either engage in solely traffic of drugs or may also be the original grower and supplier. A prominent example here is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) in Columbia and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Fd.charity (Charities/Donations)
This includes whether the group sets up front charities, co-opts a preexisting charity, or uses a legitimate charity to funnel money without the charity's knowledge. This also includes direct donations from its constituency and supporters or dues from members. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was famous for its fundraising capabilities, and many Islamic organizations such as al-Qa'ida have received funding through charities.

Fd.extort (Extortion)
Often carried out by threatening local businesses or communities with violence unless they pay what is often termed as a "revolutionary tax". Sometimes extortion is described more as if the organization is receiving donations; however, if there is any threat of violence or individuals are being force to donate, then this is extortion.

Fd.kidnap (Kidnapping)
Only when done in order to collect a monetary ransom, not for other goals such as prisoner exchanges or meeting organizational goals.

Fd.rob (Robbery)

Code if the group performs robbery for money, most commonly bank robberies like many European groups did in the 1970s and 1980s. This includes looting after a group takes over a village or territory. For example, when the Islamic State gained territory in Syria and Iraq, they would loot civilian's homes and overrun banks. These actions are included under robbery.

Fd.smuggle (Smuggling)
Code if the group smuggles products or people in order to make a profit. The most common types will be weapons smuggling and human trafficking, although other schemes like al-Qa'ida's small cigarette smuggling operation by a few of its US cells would also qualify. Do not include drug smuggling as that should be coded as drug trafficking.

Fd.otherorg (Other Violent Non-State Organization)
Code if funding comes directly from another violent non-state organization. One prevalent example is Bin Laden and al-Qa'ida's monetary support of affiliates around the globe such as Abu Sayaaf Group, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Salafist Group for Call and Combat in the late 1990s. This should also be reflected in the network data.

Org.notes (Organization Notes)
If the group is funded by another group, write in the funding organization here.

Fd.state (State Sponsor)
Code if a state provides monetary support to a group. Some historic examples of state sponsors of terrorism include Syria, Pakistan, and Iran. This should be reflected in network data as well.

State.Notes (State Sponsor Notes)
If a state or states sponsor(s) the organization, list them here.

Fd.other (Other)
If you find evidence of the group's funding that does not fit within the above categories then write in the funding type here.

XVIII.   Incidnts (Incidents, per GTD)
This is the count of all attacks the group perpetrated for the year based on the Global Terrorism Database 0814 distribution.

XIX.   Injuries (Injuries, per GTD)
This is the sum of the injuries from the group's attacks for the year based on the Global Terrorism Database 0814 distribution.

XX.   Fatlties (Fatalities, per GTD)

This is the sum of the fatalities from the group's attacks for the year based on the Global Terrorism Database 0814 distribution.

XXI. UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program Battle Death Numbers)
This is the value of the battle death best estimate for the group for the year based on UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2013, 1989-2012.

Relational Level Variables

Our relational data is dyadic and directional, not symmetric. This means that each line represents a one-to-one relationship. Therefore you will often have multiple repeat lines in one column going to different groups in another. For example, al-Qa'ida may be listed 20 times in the violent non-state group column with relationships going to different groups or states.

It also means that relationships are directional (SEND -> RECV); this becomes important particularly in regards to material supports. For example, an ally relationship may be coded as al-Qa'ida –> Taliban where al-Qa'ida provides money and training to the Taliban and then Taliban –> al-Qa'ida where the Taliban provides weapons and safe haven to al-Qa'ida. The group listed first in the violent non-state group column is the sending group, and the group or country listed as the affiliate will be the receiving group. The directionality of these data is important, as it will be reflected by directional flows in the final network map.

We assume that the relationship cited in a news article relates to the year the article was published unless it is discussed in the past tense or otherwise noted in the article. For example, if an article from June 2001 discusses the Taliban's support to al-Qa'ida only code for year 2001 unless there is something in the article that says the relationship has existed for two years, then code for the previous two years. An article may also report on past events and then you would code based on that. So if a 2001 article said in 1998 the Taliban provided Russian made AK-47s to al-Qa'ida then you would input the year 1998 for that relationship.

I. Sndorg (Sending Organization Name)

Enter the PRIMARY name of the sending organization, in proper format (remember: the name should appear just as it does on the TORG master list in order to properly be documented).

II. Sidcode (Sending Organization TORG code)

If you have correctly entered the primary name of the organization and it is on the TORG list then this field will auto populate.

III. Rcvorg (Receiving Organization Name)

Enter the PRIMARY name of the receiving organization, in proper format (remember: the name should appear just as it does on the TORG master list in order to properly be documented). If the receiving organization is a state entity (e.g., military targets), enter the PRIMARY Country Name from the ISO-a3 list.

IV.   Ridcode (Receiving Organization TORG code)

If you have correctly entered the primary name of the organization and it is on the TORG list then this field will auto populate. If receiving organization is a state entity, leave the field as #N/A.

V.   Year

This is the exact year you are coding (1998-2012) for that relationship. Each line has a separate year. Some relationships may last for many years, but each row must represent a different year. So if the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida are allies for the entire time period, there should be 14 different entries for each side of the relationship representing the exact relationship details in each year. It is important that if you find evidence for a relationship one year that you do further research to determine if the relationship existed for other years as well.

VI.   Affliatn (Affiliation Type

This is the detail of the relationship between the violent non-state organization and affiliate (whether country or other violent non-state organizations). It is important to remember that relations can be multiple for some things – these should be recorded as separate records (lines) in the relational data. For example, a group can be coded as a rival and an ally with another group or a group can be targeting and in peace talks with a country in the same year. In such cases, be sure to <u>code each relationship on separate lines</u>. The coding scheme is as follows:

Intergroup Connections

Note: It is possible to have several different types of intergroup connections between the same two groups in one year. For example, Hamas and Fatah are rivals, but in one year they might also work together (ally) or exchange some gun fire (group on group violence). Thus, in that year there would be three different codes for their relationship: rivals, allies, and violence.

6   Ally

The organizations work together in one way or another. This is an organization and organization collaborative relationship. Code in both directions.

7   Suspected Ally
Code if information is unreliable or speculative about alliance reports. Also think about potential biases of reporting source (Pakistan's ISI for example). Code in both directions. Code as suspected ally rather than ally in the following cases:

- You have a reliable source, but the article writes that the relationship is suspected, unverified, accused, or alleged.
- Less reliable sources claim they are allies but it cannot be independently verified with reliable sources. This includes sources that may have a biased interest in showing a relationship as allies even if it is not accurate. This may just be poor sources or sources specifically trying to mislead a population about the nature of a relationship (ex: Syria accusing various insurgent groups of working together). When you run across these cases try to do more research to verify the relationship in more legitimate sources.

Coder notes: If a group appears in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) as perpetrators along with another group, but you can't find any sources or information that the groups explicitly worked together or were allies, then code the two groups as suspected allies. If a news article indicates that the group was specifically coordinating activities, then they should be coded as allies, not suspected. However, the GTD includes cases where groups could have competing claims of responsibility, or a newspaper could have misattributed the perpetrator of the attack so without further evidence you can only code as suspected.


8   Rival
The organizations compete for the same object or goal as another, or try to equal or outdo another; competitor. They seek to dispute another's preeminence or superiority. (HAMAS and Fatah are perfect example of Rival & Ally relation). Code in both directions.

9   Non-State Organization Verse Non-State Organization Violence
Similar to target except this is the violent non-state organization to violent non-state organization relationship that is strongly negative and where the groups are attacking the other. The attacker is the sender and the organization being attacked is the receiver. If the groups are fighting with each other, you would code two lines, one with each group as the sender.

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