



# **Potential for radicalization amongst Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Risks, factors, and implications**

*Report to the Office of University Programs,  
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## About This Report

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## About START

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## **Executive Summary**

The purpose of the research was to investigate various factors in the radicalization of refugees of the Syrian conflict that were living in Jordan and Lebanon. Specifically, we analyzed the relationship between refugees' extremism and emigration intentions. Results showed that Syrian refugees of our samples are more willing to return to Syria than to move to a Western country. More interestingly, our findings suggest that refugees who lean more toward expressing extreme beliefs are less motivated to go to the West and therefore less likely to present a direct threat to Western societies. Similarly, refugees who want to move to the West also expressed more positive attitudes toward Western countries. These findings were consistent in both samples. Additionally, data collected in Lebanon revealed that refugees living inside camps are more prone to hold extreme beliefs than refugees living outside camps. However, the former group is also less willing to immigrate to Western countries.

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## Introduction

International migration has moved to the top of the international security agenda, and, increasingly, policymakers around the world are making links between migration policy and national security. The displacement of refugees represents a humanitarian crisis of major proportions that may contribute to both intrastate instability (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006) and interstate conflict (Salehyan, 2008). In host countries, refugee migration has been seen as a potential threat to individuals' sense of security, inducing epistemic and existential uncertainties and promoting tension and concern for violent extremism. For instance, a January 2017 public opinion survey found that 46 percent of Americans viewed "a large number of refugees leaving countries such as Iraq and Syria" as a major threat to the well-being of the United States (Pew Research Center, 2017). In Europe, a public opinion survey released in July 2016, found that "in eight of the 10 European nations surveyed, half or more believe incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country" (Pew Research Center, 2016).

Public opinion regarding refugees notwithstanding, the aim of the present research was to empirically examine the extent to which refugees pose a real threat for Western countries in terms of their level of radicalization. Currently, there is little understanding of factors that enhance refugees' propensity to radicalize. Indeed, the research on refugees is mainly conducted through a clinical approach, focusing on mental health issues, in particular among children and youths (see Bronstein & Montgomery, 2011; Fazel, Wheeler, & Danesh, 2005; Porter & Haslam 2005). This previous research aimed to develop psychosocial interventions to help refugees cope with PTSD, anxiety, and depression caused by exposure to traumatic events in the homeland and problems in the host community.

The present research diverged from this clinical approach in favor of a motivational approach. That is, we examined the fulfillment of and striving for various needs that are particularly relevant to the refugee situation. We investigated the relationship between refugees' willingness to immigrate to Western countries versus their willingness to go back to their homes in Syria and their level of extremism. Therefore, the research focused on two major groups of variables. The first set of variables focused on refugees' immigration intentions. We measured how much refugees wanted and intended to go back to Syria, as well as whether they believed it was possible to do so. We also measured whether they wanted and intended to immigrate to the West, and whether they believed it was a likely option. A second group of variables included indicators of extreme political beliefs and attitudes. We measured radical commitment to religious beliefs and willingness to sacrifice for religion. We also measured support for political violence such as fighting against the authoritarian regime and/or extremist groups. Finally, we measured refugees' general attitudes toward the West as well as their support for fighting against the West. Details regarding the variables measured are provided in the following section.

## Data and Methodology

We investigated our research questions in two countries with large populations of refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria: Jordan and Lebanon. The initial study was conducted in Jordan among refugees living outside of refugee camps. The goal of this study was to investigate the relationships between immigration

intentions and various aspects of political extremism. As this was our first time collecting data with refugee populations, Jordan also served as a testing ground to examine the reliabilities of our measures and the appropriateness of the questions for this unique sample. Thus, we refined our measures after this initial assessment and administered this refined survey in Lebanon. Because we assumed that the immediate living conditions exert effects on our variables of interest, in Lebanon we included samples of refugees living inside and outside refugee camps.

## Samples

### Jordan

Two hundred fifty Syrian refugees were surveyed in Jordan. The sample was composed of 50.4% males and 49.6% female with a mean age of 35.78 ( $SD_{age} = 12.39$ ). In terms of relationship status, 20.9% were single, 70.4% were married, and 66.8% declared to have children. The religiosity mean of the sample was 4.41 ( $SD_{religiosity} = 1.39$ ) measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all religious) to 7 (extremely religious).

### Lebanon

Two hundred fifty Syrian refugees were surveyed inside and outside camps in Lebanon. In response to a query about their religion, 23 refugees indicated that they were not Muslim and thus were excluded from the analysis, since this study focuses on Islamic extremism. The sample recruited from within refugee camps included 119 participants (Males = 44.5%, Females = 55.5%;  $M_{age} = 39.07$ ,  $SD = 16.08$ ). Relationship status percentages were as follows: 21% were single, 65.5% were married, and 67.2% had children. The religiosity mean was 4.18 ( $SD_{religiosity} = 1.62$ ). The sample of refugees that did not reside in camps contained 108 participants (Males = 57.4%, Females = 42.6%;  $M_{age} = 38.11$ ,  $SD = 14.29$ ). Within this sample, 27% were single, 59% were married, and 51% declared to have children. Mean religiosity was 3.50 ( $SD_{religiosity} = 1.42$ ).

## Survey

### Jordan

Immigration intentions were measured with two sets of items. The first examined participants' willingness to go back to Syria. Three items specifically measured how much participants wanted to return to Syria, the likelihood of them returning, and whether they intended to return. Responses were given using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = Very much so) ( $M = 4.43$ ,  $SD = 1.91$ ,  $\alpha = .72$ ). A similar set of three items measured participants wanting to immigrate to a Western country, their likelihood of immigrating to the West, and their intentions of immigrating to the West ( $M = 3.48$ ,  $SD = 2.39$ ,  $\alpha = .96$ ).

The last variety of survey items examined endorsement of extreme positions and willingness to engage in extreme behaviors. The intention of some of these items was to examine the terrorism risk refugees may pose. These items measured their endorsement of Islamic extremism, their willingness to fight against the West, and their willingness to engage in self-sacrifice on behalf of their religion. Islamic extremism was measured using a 15-item scale, which included items like "The Qu'ran should only be understood

according to its literal meaning” and “True Muslims should adhere strictly to the literal meaning of the Quran.” ( $M = 4.54, SD = 1.32, \alpha = .83$ ). Willingness to sacrifice for religion (Sacrifice for religion) was measured using a 6-item scale. Sample items include: “I would approve of others using violence to defend my religion” and “I would be willing to give my life to defend my religion.” ( $M = 4.79, SD = 1.72, \alpha = .87$ ). These items were all completed on the same 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree).

In addition to these ideology-related items, we measured refugees’ endorsement of items pertaining to the Syrian conflict. Namely, we measured their willingness to personally fight or support others in fighting against either oppressive government regimes or extremist groups. These items did not reference the specific actors of the conflict (e.g., the Syrian government, ISIS), as we thought participants may be hesitant to answer about their government directly. Endorsement of these items might suggest that refugees are supportive of fighting against groups that are also deemed enemies of the West and of Western democracy. Willingness to support fighting against oppressive government regime (Fighting against regime) was measured using a five-item scale. Examples of items are (1) “I would support Syrian people fighting against oppressive government regimes” and (2) “I would personally join in the fight against oppressive government regimes.” ( $M = 2.93, SD = 1.72, \alpha = .82$ ). Willingness to support those fighting against extremist groups (Fighting against extremist groups) was measured using the same five-item scale, except “oppressive government regimes” was replaced with “extremist groups” ( $M = 4.19, SD = 1.49, \alpha = .78$ ). These scales used the same seven-point scale described above.

Finally, we measured one last form in which refugees might support violence, namely, violence done in the service of defending immigrants’ rights (Sacrifice for immigrants’ rights). This scale also included six items completed on the same seven-point scale, such as “I would approve of others using violence to defend immigrants’ rights in Western countries” and “I would be willing to give away all my belongings if it prevents the oppression of immigrants in Western countries” ( $M = 2.78, SD = 1.80, \alpha = .94$ ).

### Lebanon

On the basis of the initial study in Jordan, the scales were refined and revised. The scales still measured the same factors, but number and wording of items was changed in some cases. The following are the measures used in the study carried out in Lebanon: Willingness to go back to Syria (three items) ( $M = 4.84, SD = 1.25, \alpha = .71$ ) and to go to the West (three items) ( $M = 2.65, SD = 1.99, \alpha = .93$ ); Sacrifice for refugees’ rights (seven items, the items were the same used in Jordan to measure Sacrifice for refugees’ rights, except the word “immigrants” was replaced with “refugees”) ( $M = 2.80, SD = 1.25, \alpha = .89$ ); Fighting against regime (five items) ( $M = 3.99, SD = 1.27, \alpha = .77$ ); Fighting against extremist groups (three items) ( $M = 4.50, SD = .93, \alpha = .75$ ); Support for fighting against the West (five items) ( $M = 2.87, SD = 1.53, \alpha = .91$ ).

Additionally, the willingness to sacrifice for religion scale, also used in the study in Jordan, was here divided in two subscales to capture two different forms of sacrifice: non-violent versus violent. Nonviolent sacrifice for religion was measured using three items, such as “I would be willing to give away all my belongings to defend my religion”) ( $M = 5.09, SD = 1.25, \alpha = .74$ ). Violent sacrifice was measured

using four items: including “I would be willing use violence to defend my religion” ( $M = 2.91, SD = 1.80, \alpha = .82$ ).



Likewise, the measure of Islamic extremism was expanded to capture endorsement of extreme ideology versus endorsement of extreme violence. Seven items were used to measure Islamic violent extremism. Sample items include: “Suicide bombers will be rewarded for their deed by God” and “Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge” ( $M = 3.21, SD = 1.22, \alpha = .86$ ). Eleven items were used to measure Islamic ideological extremism. Examples of items are “Islam is the only true religion” and “True Muslims should adhere strictly to the literal meaning of the Quran” ( $M = 4.00, SD = 1.10, \alpha = .87$ ).

Finally, a five-item measure of attitudes toward the West was included. Sample items include: “Western cultures are generally immoral” and “Western countries often violate other people’s human rights around the world” ( $M = 2.88, SD = 1.68, \alpha = .92$ ). High scores indicate high negative attitudes towards the West.

## Results

### Study in Jordan

Our main finding concerns the immigration intentions of refugees. Most of the Syrians in our sample did not want to immigrate to the West. Instead, they primarily wanted to go back to Syria, despite the fact that they did not think it would be likely to happen in the near future (see Figure 1).



The indicators of extreme social beliefs show that refugees endorsed sacrifice for a religious cause ( $M = 4.79, SD = 1.72$ ) more than for a political cause (e.g., rights of immigrants) ( $M = 2.78, SD = 1.80$ ) ( $t_{(1,239)} = -16.145, p < .001$ ). Participants were also more willing to fight against extremist groups ( $M = 4.19, SD = 1.49$ ) than against the regime ( $M = 2.93, SD = 1.72$ ) ( $t_{(1,233)} = 9.56, p < .001$ ) (see Figure 2).

Next, we explored the relationships between the variables. Correlations between emigration intentions and various forms of extremism are presented in Table 1. Refugees who expressed a willingness to emigrate to the West (measured as a combination of wanting, intention, and likelihood) were at the same



time less ideologically extreme and less willing to sacrifice for a cause than those who did not intend to go to the West. On the other hand, refugees who supported political violence and ideological sacrifice were more motivated to go back to Syria than those who were less extreme. This finding suggest that contrary to popular belief, refugees who are more prone to express extreme beliefs are less motivated to go to the West and therefore less likely to pose a direct threat to Western societies (see Table 1).


Table 1. Jordan: Emigration intentions and Extremism

	Ideological Extremism	Violent Extremism	Violent Religious Sacrifice	Nonviolent Religious Sacrifice	Negative Attitudes to West	Fight Against the West
Back to Syria	.20**	.04	.12	.29***	.10	.02
Back to the West	-.59***	-.43***	-.31***	-.43***	-.58***	-.45***

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$


### Study in Lebanon

The analysis of descriptive statistics showed a similar pattern to what we obtained in Jordan. Again, refugees expressed a greater desire to return to Syria ( $M = 6.25, SD = 1.50$ ) than to move to the West ( $M = 3.11, SD = 2.48$ ). By the same token, most of the refugees in our sample did not have any intention to immigrate to the West ( $M = 2.88, SD = 2.36$ ), but they intend to go back to Syria ( $M = 5.61, SD = 1.90$ ) (see Figure 3). Interestingly, there was an overwhelming understanding within the sample that both of these alternatives were unlikely to happen. For instance, even though most participants wanted and intended to return to Syria, they assumed that the chances of that actually happening were low ( $M = 2.28, SD = 1.24$ ).



With regard to extremism, Syrian refugees in Lebanon were found to endorse Islamic religious fundamentalism ( $M = 4.00$ ) more than violent fundamentalism ( $M = 3.22$ ) ( $F(1, 226) = 259.21, p < .001$ ).

Both indicators of fundamentalism were just below the midpoint of the scale. Moreover, refugees were found to be more willing to sacrifice for religion in a non-violent way ( $M = 5.10$ ) than to support violence, even if it was religiously motivated violence ( $M = 2.92$ ), ( $F(1, 226) = 572.74, p < .001$ ). Refugees were also found to be more likely to support fighting extremist groups ( $M = 4.51$ ), than to support fighting against the regime ( $M = 3.99$ ); support for fighting against the West was lower than support for fighting either extremists groups or the regime ( $M = 2.87$ ), ( $F(1, 226) = 116.63, p < .001$ ). Additionally, results indicated that refugees do not perceive the West in an extremely negative way ( $M = 2.87$ ) (see Figure 4).



Next, we explored the relationships between willingness to immigrate and extreme ideological beliefs. Replicating findings obtained in Jordan, refugees who expressed the intention to immigrate to the West were also less ideologically extreme and less willing to sacrifice for religion (both in a non-violent and violent way) than those who, instead, wanted to move back to Syria. On the other hand, refugees who supported political violence and ideological sacrifice were more motivated to go back to Syria than those who were less extreme. In other words, in Lebanon more extreme individuals were less likely to express the desire to immigrate to the West (see Table 2).

Table 2. Lebanon: Emigration intentions and Extremism

	Ideological Extremism	Fight Against Regime	Fight Against Extremism	Religious Sacrifice	Fight Against the West
Back to Syria	.08	.30**	.20**	.05	.26**
Back to the West	-.32**	-.09	-.13*	-.25**	-.21

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$

Finally, we compared refugees living inside and outside of camps. Means (and standard deviations) for each group are presented in Table 3. Analyses revealed that refugees residing inside camps were significantly more extreme on all measures of extremism. That is, participants living within camps reported higher Islamic extremism (violent and ideological), greater support for fighting against the West, and a greater willingness to self-sacrifice on behalf of their religion. We consider all of these indicators of risk for engaging in Islamic extremism. Interestingly, the only scale on which the two samples did not differ was their support for fighting against extremist groups, the means of which were high among both groups.

Consistent with the results described beforehand, refugees living inside camps expressed a lower intention to move to Western countries. Overall, refugees, regardless of where they reside, prefer to return to Syria instead of moving to Western countries (see Table 3).

Table 3. Lebanon. Inside - Outside camps comparison, M, SD, t –test, df, and p-value

<i>Measures</i>	<i>Inside camps (N = 119)</i>	<i>Inside camps (N = 119)</i>	<i>Outside camps (N = 108)</i>	<i>Outside camps (N = 108)</i>	<i>t-test</i>	<i>degrees of freedom</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>			
<b>Go back to Syria</b>	<b>4.94</b>	<b>1.23</b>	<b>4.74</b>	<b>1.27</b>	<b>1.19</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>.236</b>
<b>Go to the West</b>	<b>2.24</b>	<b>1.78</b>	<b>3.12</b>	<b>2.13</b>	<b>-3.35</b>	<b>209.26</b>	<b>.001</b>
<b>Fighting against regime</b>	<b>4.25</b>	<b>1.31</b>	<b>3.71</b>	<b>1.18</b>	<b>3.22</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>.001</b>
<b>Fighting against extremist groups</b>	<b>4.60</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>4.40</b>	<b>.81</b>	<b>1.68</b>	<b>220.94</b>	<b>.094</b>
<b>Islamic extremism</b>	<b>4.30</b>	<b>1.05</b>	<b>3.68</b>	<b>1.07</b>	<b>4.38</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Islamic violent extremism</b>	<b>3.56</b>	<b>1.23</b>	<b>2.84</b>	<b>1.10</b>	<b>4.66</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Fighting the West</b>	<b>3.27</b>	<b>1.67</b>	<b>2.43</b>	<b>1.23</b>	<b>4.34</b>	<b>215.75</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Violent sacrifice for religion</b>	<b>3.45</b>	<b>1.95</b>	<b>2.33</b>	<b>1.42</b>	<b>4.99</b>	<b>215.34</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Nonviolent sacrifice for religion</b>	<b>5.47</b>	<b>1.08</b>	<b>4.69</b>	<b>1.32</b>	<b>4.88</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Attitude toward the West</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>2.63</b>	<b>1.44</b>	<b>2.09</b>	<b>220.10</b>	<b>.037</b>

## Conclusions

### General conclusions

Results showed that despite the image of Syrian refugees that seems to prevail in Western societies, Syrian refugees of our samples are more willing to return to Syria than to move to a Western country. More interestingly, our findings further suggest that refugees who are more prone to express extreme beliefs are less motivated to go to the West and therefore less likely to pose a direct threat to Western societies. On the other hand, refugees who want to move to the West are the ones who also expressed more positive attitudes toward Western countries. These findings were consistent in both samples.

## Implications for counterterrorism efforts and refugee immigration policy

These findings have major implications for counterterrorism efforts and immigration policy surrounding refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. As discussed at the onset, the public perception of refugees seeking asylum in Western countries is negative—there is a belief that letting these individuals enter one’s country increases that country’s risk of terror attacks. The less extreme version of these beliefs is that refugees fleeing the violence are sympathetic to the beliefs and actions of Islamic extremist organizations in Syria, and will therefore bring with them a propensity to engage in violence against the West after immigrating. The more extreme narrative is that extremist organizations like ISIS are purposefully embedding terrorists within the refugee population and sending them to carry out attacks terrorists themselves. Regardless, this concern breaks down into two pieces: (a) refugees want to enter Western countries, where (b) because of their extremist views, refugees will engage in acts of terrorism. Our findings directly invalidate both claims—few Syrian refugees even want to immigrate to the West, and those who do are less likely to endorse tenets of Islamic extremism, harbor negativity toward the West, or support the use of violence against these countries (whether personal or by others). Our findings provide empirical evidence that can help correct this image in the public sphere. Doing so may ease some of the resistance against admitting refugees into one’s country and hopefully increase countries’ willingness to assist in tackling the present refugee crisis.

This image correction is also critical, because the reception of refugees within their host countries has vast ramifications for the future security of a nation. Although our findings show that refugees currently pose little terrorism threat, they do not speak to the security threat posed by incoming refugees five, 10, or even 20 years from now. The public perception of refugees influences the treatment that refugees will receive in their new host country. That is, if the public is afraid of refugees and harbors negativity toward them, this will influence their willingness to interact with and accept them into their country. These individuals could then feel alienated, discriminated against, and unappreciated. This nexus of feelings speaks to a universal need to feel significant, that has been linked in past research to greater extremism (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009; Jasko, LaFree, Kruglanski, 2017). Thus, there is a risk that if these negative attitudes toward refugees are not corrected, we could be creating entire populations of people who feel insignificant and are thus more likely to turn to terrorism as way to remedy these feelings.

Results obtained by comparing refugees living in camps and outside camps showed that refugees living in the camps were significantly more extreme regardless of the type of measure that was used to capture these feelings. This suggests that refugees being housed in refugee camps are at a higher risk of radicalization. Whether or not this heightened risk is caused by unsatisfactory conditions in camps and the treatment received within those camps, we cannot say. Because of the correlational nature of our data, it is also possible that more extreme individuals happened to be housed within camps, and the radicalization risk therein is irrelevant to the conditions and treatment. These possibilities would need to be addressed using research methodologies that provide an indication of causation.

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**APPENDIX**

**SURVEY IN JORDAN**

**Willingness to go back to Syria**

Please respond to the following questions according to this scale:  
 1=Not at all, 7=Very much so

1	How much would you like to go back to Syria?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	How likely is it that you could go back to Syria?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	Do you intend to go back to Syria?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to support fighting against oppressive government regime**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale:  
 1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would support Syrian people fighting against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would support my friends and family if they were fighting against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would support a foreign military interventions to fight oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	I would support violent extremist groups if they were fighting against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would personally join in the fight against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to support those fighting against extremist groups**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale:  
 1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would support Syrian people fighting against violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would support my friends and family if they were fighting against violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would support a foreign military interventions to fight violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	I would support an oppressive government regime to fight violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would personally join in the fight against violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Islamic extremism**

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements according to the following scale:  
 1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	The Qu’ran should only be understood according to its literal meaning.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	Religion and politics should be kept separate.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	Under no circumstances does Islam support the killing of civilians.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	Political leaders in our country should be selected solely by Islamic clerics.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	Islam should be practiced in the strictest way, regardless of situations or circumstance.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
6	Jihad is the only remedy for jahiliyyah (ignorance).	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
7	Armed Jihad is a personal obligation of all Muslims today.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
8	Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
9	True Muslims should adhere strictly to the literal meaning of the Quran.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
10	I think it is important for Muslims to revive the Caliphate.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
11	The goal of Jihad is to restore justice for Muslims worldwide.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
12	Muslims should follow the ways of the Salafi.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
13	Islam is the only true religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
14	I think it is important to establish an Islamic state in my country.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
15	There are many different ways of interpreting Islam.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to sacrifice for religion**

While thinking about your religion, please indicate how much you agree with the following statements using the following scale:

1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would approve of others using violence to defend their religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would support protests to defend my religion, even if those protests turn violent.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would be willing to give away all my belongings to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	I would be willing to endure intense suffering to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would be willing to go to prison to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
6	I would be willing to give my life to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Intentions of immigrating to the West**

Please respond to the following questions according to this scale:  
 1=Not at all, 7=Very much so

1	How much would you like to move to a Western country?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	How likely is it that you could move to a Western country?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	Do you intend to move to a Western country?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to fight for immigrants in the West**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale:  
 1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would approve of others using violence to fight against the oppression of immigrants in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would support protests in Western countries against the oppression of immigrants, even if those protests turn violent.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would be willing to give away all my belongings if it prevented the oppression of immigrants in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	I would be willing to endure intense suffering if it prevented the oppression of immigrants in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would be willing to go to prison if it prevented the oppression of immigrants in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
6	I would be willing to give my life if it prevented the oppression of immigrants in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7



**SURVEY IN LEBANON**

**Willingness to go back to Syria**

Please respond to the following questions according to this scale:

1=Not at all, 7=Very much so

1	How much would you like to go back to Syria?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	How likely is it that you could go back to Syria?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	Do you intend to go back to Syria?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to support fighting against oppressive government regime**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale:

1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would support Syrian people fighting against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would support my friends and family if they were fighting against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would support a foreign military interventions to fight oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	I would support violent extremist groups if they were fighting against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would personally join in the fight against oppressive government regimes.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to support those fighting against extremist groups**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale:

1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would support Syrian people fighting against violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would support my friends and family if they were fighting against violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would support a foreign military interventions to fight violent extremist groups.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Islamic extremism**

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements according to the following scale:  
1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	Islam should be practiced in the strictest way, regardless of situations or circumstance.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	True Muslims should adhere strictly to the literal meaning of the Quran.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	The only way to practice Islam in totality (Islam Kaffah) is to have no separation between religious law (shariyah) and state law.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	True Muslims must listen (As-Sam'u) to the instructions of religious leaders and obey them without question (At-Tha'ah).	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I think this is important for Muslims to revive the Caliphate.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
6	Islam cannot be practiced fully in a non-Muslim state.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
7	The Qu'ran should only be understood according to its literal meaning.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
8	Political leaders in our country should be selected solely by Islamic clerics.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
9	Muslims should follow the ways of the Salafi.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
10	Islam is the only true religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
11	I think it is important to establish an Islamic state in my country.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Islamic violent extremism**

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements according to the following scale:  
1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	Armed Jihad is a personal obligation of all Muslims today.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	Suicide bombers will be rewarded for their deed by God.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	Qital (fighting) is the only way to conduct Jihad.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	All countries that are not ruled by Muslims and do not observe sharyiah (Islamic law) should be considered darul harb (abode of war).	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
6	Jihad is the only remedy for jahiliyyah (ignorance).	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
7	The goal of Jihad is to restore justice for Muslims worldwide.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to sacrifice for religion (non-violent)**

While thinking about your religion, please indicate how much you agree with the following statements using the following scale:

1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would be willing to give away all my belongings to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would be willing to endure intense suffering to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would be willing to give my life to defend my religion	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to sacrifice for religion (violent)**

While thinking about your religion, please indicate how much you agree with the following statements using the following scale:

1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

4	I would support protests to defend my religion, even if those protests turn violent.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would be willing to go to prison to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
6	I would be willing to attack police or security forces to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
7	I would be willing to use violence to defend my religion.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Intentions of immigrating to the West**

Please respond to the following questions according to this scale:

1=Not at all, 7=Very much so

1	How much would you like to move to a Western country?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	How likely is it that you could move to a Western country?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	Do you intend to move to a Western country?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Willingness to fight for refugees in the West**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale:

1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would be willing to give away all my belongings if it prevented the oppression of refugees in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would be willing to endure intense suffering if it prevented the oppression of refugees in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would be willing to give my life if it prevented the oppression of refugees in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	I would be willing to join protests in Western countries against the oppression of refugees, even if those protests turn violent.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would be willing to go to prison if it prevented the oppression of refugees in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
6	I would be willing to attack police or security forces if I saw them beating refugees.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
7	I would be willing to use violence if it prevented the oppression of refugees in Western countries.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Fighting against the West**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the following scale:  
 1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree

1	I would support Syrian people fighting against the West.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	I would support my friends and family if they were fighting against the West.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	I would support a foreign country in their fight against the West.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	I would support violent extremist groups if they were fighting against the West.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	I would personally join in the fight against the West.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7

**Attitudes toward the West**

Please respond to the following questions according to this scale:  
 1=Not at all, 7=Very much so

1	Western nations are forcing their values on Muslims throughout the world.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
2	The aggression of Western countries must be stopped by any means possible.	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
3	Western countries often violate other people's human rights around the world	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
4	Western cultures are generally immoral	1...2...3...4...5...6...7
5	In recent years, some people called on all Muslims to join in Armed Jihad against the United States and the West. To what extent do you support this call to armed Jihad?	1...2...3...4...5...6...7