Incident Summary:
11/26/2008: On Wednesday night, three people were killed when assailants left RDX explosives with timers in a taxi in Wadi Bundar and another taxi in Vile Parle in Mumbai. The attack was one of eight coordinated attacks at various locations in Mumbai on 11/26/2008 to 11/29/2008 in which a total of 171 people were killed and 250 were wounded. After nearing Mumbai by boat between 2030 and 2100, the assailants split into five teams of two each and hailed taxis. After taking the taxis, the assailants planted RDX bombs with timers in the two taxis-one at Wadi Bundar, and the other at Vile Parle. Two drivers and one bystander were killed in the explosions. From the taxis, the assailants set off to their different destinations to carry out further attacks. Deccan Mujahedeen, a previously unknown group, claimed responsibility for the attack. The claim has not been confirmed. Officials suspected Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) were responsible for the attack, although a spokesman for the LeT denied its involvement. Ajmal Kasab, an assailant captured on 11/26/2008, told authorities that the attack was a plan devised six months prior that hoped to kill 5,000 people, targeting whites who were preferably Americans or British. According to Kasab, the assailants posed as students during a visit to Mumbai during the previous month to familiarize themselves with the city’s roads and to film the “strike locations”. Kasab confessed to being a member of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), belonging to the LeT’s Fidayeen (suicide squad). He also identified the masterminds of the attack, who were detained after a raid on an LeT camp on 12/07/2008 and formally indicted on 05/12/2009 for their involvement in the attacks. In May 2010, Kasab was convicted and sentenced to death for his role in the attacks.
Overview
GTD ID:
200811260002
When:
2008-11-26
Country:
India
Region:
South Asia
Province/administrative
region/u.s. state:
Maharashtra
City:
Mumbai
Location Details:
The attack took place in Fiat taxis in Wadi Bundar and Vile Parle in Mumbai.
What
Attack Information
Type of Attack () |
Bombing/Explosion |
Successful Attack? () |
Yes |
Target Information ()
Target Type: Transportation |
Name of Entity |
|
Specific Description |
Black and yellow Fiat taxis |
Nationality of Target |
India |
Additional Information
Hostages |
No |
Ransom |
No |
Property Damage |
Yes |
Extent of Property Damage |
Minor (likely < $1 million) |
Value of Property Damage |
Unknown |
How
Weapon Information
Type |
Sub-type |
Explosives |
Vehicle |
Weapon Details |
RDX explosives and timers were used in the attack. |
Additional Information
Suicide Attack? | No |
Part of Multiple Incident? | Yes |
Criterion 1 () |
Yes |
Criterion 2 () |
Yes |
Criterion 3 () |
Yes |
Doubt Terrorism Proper () |
No |
Additional Information |
This was one of eight related attacks (cf. 200811130010, 200811260001, 200811260005, 200811260003, 200811260006, 200811260009 and 200811260010). A leading commander of the LeT group, admitted he advised the terrorists by telephone as the attack unfolded. Controllers in Pakistan watched live television and warned the gunmen of the arrival of Indian commandos, according to evidence amassed by the FBI and handed over to the Pakistani government. The American agency had decoded Skype calls over the internet that were made between the gunmen in the two five-star hotels and a Jewish hostel in Mumbai with their Lashkar controllers in Pakistan. Talking in colloquial Punjabi, the controllers repeatedly told the attackers to “Aag lagao” (“Light the fire”), which has been interpreted in India as a way of maximizing casualties. During the conversation, the men were also instructed to kill all the Israelis who were held captive in the Jewish hostel, but to spare all the Muslims. He confirmed that the 10 assailants were trained in Pakistani Kashmir and then travelled by boat from Karachi to Mumbai. |
Who
Perpetrator Statistics
Number of Perpetrators |
10 |
Number of Captured Perpetrators |
0 |
Casualty Information
Total Number of Casualties |
3 Fatalities / 0 Injured |
Total Number of Fatalities |
3 |
Number of U.S. Fatalities |
0 |
Number of Perpetrator Fatalities |
0 |
Total Number of Injured |
0 |
Number of U.S. Injured |
0 |
Number of Perpetrators Injured |
0 |
Sources
Sources
Somni Sengupta and Keith Bradsher, "India Faces Reckoning as Terror Toll Eclipses 170," New York Times, November 29, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/asia/30mumbai.html?pagewanted=2&fta=y. |
Press Trust of India, "Ismail Killed tTree Cops at Cama: Ajmal," Press Trust of India, November 12, 2008. |
Press Trust of India, "Ismail Killed tTree Cops at Cama: Ajmal," Press Trust of India, November 12, 2008. |
Criteria
Criteria 1
The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.
Criterion 2
There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.
Criterion 3
The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants.
Doubt Terrorism Proper
The existence of a "Yes" for "Doubt Terrorism Proper?" records reservation, in the eyes of GTD analysts, that the incident in question is truly terrorism. Such uncertainty, however, was not deemed to be sufficient to disqualify the incident from inclusion into the GTD. Furthermore, such a determination of doubt is subsequently coded by GTD analysts as conforming to one of four possible alternative designations: 1) Insurgency/Guerilla Action; 2) Internecine Conflict Action; 3) Mass Murder; or 4) Purely Criminal Act.
Alternate Designation
The determination of "yes" for "Doubt Terrorism Proper" by GTD analysts is coded as conforming to one of four possible alternative designations: 1) Insurgency/Guerilla Action; 2) Internecine Conflict Action; 3) Mass Murder; or 4) Purely Criminal Act.
Successful Attack
Success of a terrorist strike is defined according to the tangible effects of the attack. For example, in a typical successful bombing, the bomb detonates and destroys property and/or kills individuals, whereas an unsuccessful bombing is one in which the bomb is discovered and defused or detonates early and kills the perpetrators. Success is not judged in terms of the larger goals of the perpetrators. For example, a bomb that exploded in a building would be counted as a success even if it did not, for example, succeed in bringing the building down or inducing government repression.
Type of Attack
This field captures the general method of attack and often reflects the broad class of tactics used. It consists of the following nine categories:
- Assassination
- Armed Assault
- Unarmed Assault
- Bombing/Explosion
- Hijacking
- Hostage taking (Barricade Incident)
- Hostage taking (Kidnapping)
- Facility / Infrastructure Attack
- Unknown
Target Information
This field captures the general type of target. It consists of the following 22 categories:
- Abortion Related
- Airports & Airlines
- Business
- Government (General)
- Government (Diplomatic)
- Educational Institution
- Food or Water Supply
- Journalists & Media
- Maritime (includes Ports and Maritime facilities)
- Military
- NGO
- Other
- Police
- Private Citizens & Property
- Religious Figures/Institutions
- Telecommunication
- Terrorists
- Tourists
- Transportation (other than aviation)
- Unknown
- Utilities
- Violent Political Parties