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A Spiral of Peace: Competition, Monopoly and Diversification in the Market for Political Violence in Northern Ireland


A Spiral of Peace: Competition, Monopoly and Diversification in the Market for Political Violence in Northern Ireland

Abstract: 
What makes Northern Ireland such an intriguing case for studying conflict resolution is the fact that there were two substantively major, very similar peace agreements, but it took 25 additional years of violence, death and destruction before the second one was able to end the Troubles. There are several largely symbolic differences between the two agreements, but the failure of the first and success of the second has much more to do with the changes in structural conditions than the actual terms of the two agreements. The exclusion of the paramilitaries from, even antipathy toward, the power-sharing arrangements in 1973-4 meant they had no incentive to cooperate by ending the violence, whereas their deliberate inclusion in the 1990s produced a workable peace. Why, then, were the paramilitaries willing to enter into the successful negotiations of 1998 when the fruits of the negotiation were just as limited as in 1973?

Publication Information

Full Citation: 

Sawyer, John. 2008. "A Spiral of Peace: Competition, Monopoly and Diversification in the Market for Political Violence in Northern Ireland." Quest Issue (January): 20-53. http://www.qub.ac.uk/sites/QUEST/FileStore/Issue7Mitchell/Filetoupload,1...

START Author(s): 
John Sawyer
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