Employees are the Achilles’ heel of nuclear installations. Skilled insiders can cause more damage and steal radioactive material more easily than outsiders can. All known cases of nuclear theft appear to have involved insiders, as did several cases of sabotage. The prospect of a terrorist insider has therefore long worried governments and should continue to do so. But effective countermeasures require a nuanced and empirically based understanding of the threat. This chapter seeks to inform insider-threat assessments by taking stock of what terrorists have said and done in the past with regard to nuclear insider plots.
Hegghammer, Thomas and Andreas Hoelstad Dehli. 2016. "Insiders and Outsiders: A Survey of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Facilities." In Insider Threats, eds. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 10-41. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4d0ZDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&ots=D_9Ij9sYvz&sig=VIHqb-e9hRA6UHgrM0I7CwqJ-X8#v=onepage&q&f=false